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T he	theory	and	culture	of	the	arts	has	been	largely	focused	on	the	arts	of	objects	and	has	largely	ignored	the	arts	of	action.	Here,	I	wish	to	draw	attention	to	the	neglected	arts	of	action.	
These	are	the	arts	intended	to	engender	agency	and	activity	in	their	
audience,	for	the	sake	of	the	audience’s	aesthetic	appreciation	of	that	
activity.	 This	 includes	 their	 appreciation	 of	 their	 own	 deliberations,	
choices,	reactions,	and	movements.
The	aesthetics	of	our	own	actions	are	already	a	natural	part	of	the	
rich	 experience	 of	 our	 lives.	 And	 the	 arts	 of	 action	 already	 exist	 in	
plenty;	we	are	surrounded	by	them.	Many	of	our	artifacts	are	designed	
for	the	sake	of	encouraging	and	structuring	the	aesthetics	of	actions.	
Games,	 cities,	 food	 rituals,	 social	 dances,	 and	 more	—	all	 are	 forms	
which	sculpt	activity,	often	for	aesthetic	ends.	But	these	arts	have	been	
inadequately	 appreciated	 in	 theoretical	 work	 on	 art	 and	 aesthetics,	
and	often	ignored	in	much	public	reflection	on	the	value	of	the	arts.	
They	are	rarely	called	“arts”,	but,	I	argue,	they	deserve	to	be.	
Consider	 rock	 climbing.	 Rock	 climbing	 is	 a	 profoundly	 aesthetic	
enterprise.	 Climbing	 culture	 is	 replete	 with	 aesthetic	 lingo.	 Climb-
ers	talk	about	the	beautiful	movement	of	a	climb,	about	the	exquisite	
grace	that	a	particularly	tricky	sequence	called	out	of	them.	Many	peo-
ple	climb	in	order	 to	experience	their	own	graceful,	 interesting,	dra-
matic	movement.1	What’s	more,	the	quality	of	a	climber’s	movement	is	
significantly	conditioned	by	an	external	object.	Each	climb	calls	for	a	
particular	form	of	motion.	One	climb	calls	for	powerful,	direct,	aggres-
sive	movement;	another	one	for	loose,	monkey-like	swinging	around;	
another	 for	 dainty,	 precisely	 balanced,	 tiny	 steps.	 And	 climbs,	 and	
their	implied	movement,	can	be	designed.	In	climbing	gyms,	“setters”	
design	climbing	routes,	creating	puzzles	to	solve	in	movement.	And	
the	particular	details	of	those	puzzles	shape	the	nature	of	the	resulting	
movement.	Similarly,	 some	board	games	are	designed	 to	encourage	
particular	turns	of	mind.	For	example,	the	design	of	chess	offers	a	con-
centrated	access	to	a	particularly	elegant	form	of	cogitation.	The	chess	
player	gets	 to	experience	the	emergence	of	a	 lovely	solution	from	a	
1.	 (Nguyen	2017a).	For	general	discussion	of	the	aesthetics	of	movement	from	
the	philosophy	of	sport,	see	(Best	1974;	Cordner	1984).
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in	 where	 the	 primary	 aesthetic	 properties	 emerge.	 In	 the	 arts	 of	 ob-
jects,	the	artist	 imbues	the	artifact	itself	with	aesthetic	properties.	In	
the	arts	of	action,	the	artist	creates	the	artifact	in	order	to	call	forth	aes-
thetic	action,	where	the	intended	aesthetic	properties	will	emerge	in	
the	actions	themselves.	(I	mean	here	an	“artifact”	in	the	loosest	sense,	
which	includes	physical	objects	such	as	rock	climbing	routes,	plated	
dishes	of	food,	rituals	such	as	the	Passover	Seder,	communal	practices	
such	as	tango	dancing,	and	entities	as	abstract	as	the	rules	for	a	party	
game.)
By	 contrasting	 the	 arts	 of	 action	 with	 the	 arts	 of	 objects,	 I	 don’t	
mean	to	be	drawing	a	distinction	between	live	performances	and	stat-
ic	physical	artifacts.	For	my	purposes,	I	count	paintings,	novels,	movies,	
musical	performances,	theatrical	performances,	and	staged	dances	as	
exemplars	 of	 the	 traditional	 arts	 of	 objects.	 In	 all	 these	 cases,	 there	
is	some	work	which	exists	independently	of	an	audience,	which	the	
audience	appreciates	and	to	which	we	attribute	aesthetic	properties.	
In	a	live	performance	as	much	as	a	painting,	the	aesthetic	properties	
adhere	to	some	external	artifact.	It	is	this	performance	of	King Lear	that	
captures	the	particular	tragedy	of	regret	so	well;	it	is	the	album	Enter 
the Wu Tang (36 Chambers) which	is	full	of	eerie	aural	space	and	satis-
fyingly	unhinged	rhythm.	The	arts	of	action,	on	 the	other	hand,	are	
marked	by	distinctively	self-reflective	aesthetic	appreciation.	In	these	
arts,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 appreciator’s	 aesthetic	 attention	 is	 on	 the	 aes-
thetic	qualities	of	their	own	actions.	
The	term	‘action’	—	though	in	some	ways	the	most	evocative	of	my	
interest	—	is	 philosophically	 fraught,	 and	 some	 of	 its	 colloquial	 con-
notations	are	a	bit	narrow	for	my	purposes.	Let	me	switch	to	a	slightly	
less	 laden	 term.	 Let’s	 call	 the	 larger	 realm	 here	 “process	 aesthetics”	
and	stipulate	that	the	term	‘process’	refers	specifically	to	activity	from	
the	perspective	of	 the	actor.	Process	aesthetics	covers	the	aesthetics	
of	mental	and	physical	processes,	including,	but	not	limited	to,	one’s	
own	 investigating,	 thinking,	 perceiving,	 deciding,	 choosing,	 mov-
ing,	changing,	and	acting	upon	external	objects.	It	also	includes	the	
aesthetics	of	the	world,	experienced	as	part	of	the	activity.	Part	of	the	
thousand	tactical	minutiae,	and	they	get	it	with	some	frequency	—	far	
more	than	they	are	likely	to	get	from	grinding	away	at	the	actual	prob-
lems	 of	 the	 world	 (Osborne	 1964).	 Rock	 climbing	 and	 chess,	 I	 will	
argue,	are	examples	of	the	arts of	action.	They	are	practices	oriented	
around	 designing	 artifacts	 and	 procedures,	 which	 sculpt,	 encourage,	
and	call	forth	aesthetic	experiences	of	doing.
1. Process art and object art
Let’s	take	a	step	back.	There	is	a	large	category	of	human	practice:	the	
arts.	Speaking	loosely,	the	arts	are	the	practice	of	manufacturing	arti-
facts	for	aesthetic	reasons.2	We	have	been,	I	think,	too	ready	to	think	
that	this	practice	can	be	filled	out	only	in	one	particular	way:	An	artist	
creates	an	artifact	and	imbues	it	with	aesthetic	properties.	The	artifact	
is	 the	artwork	and	the	bearer	of	aesthetic	properties.	Then	the	audi-
ence	comes	along	and	experiences	 the	artifact,	appreciating	the	aes-
thetic	properties	that	occur	in	the	artifact.	The	artifact	bridges	the	gap	
between	artist	and	audience	by	acting	as	a	kind	of	carrier	for	aesthetic	
properties.	This	is	the	general	schema	of	the	arts	of	objects.
But	I	am	suggesting	that	there	is	at	least	one	more,	very	different	
schema	for	 the	arts:	 that	of	 the	arts	of	action.	 In	 that	schema,	some	
person	 (or	 persons)	 makes	 an	 artifact.	 (We	 might	 as	 well	 call	 them	
the	artist,	 though	we	could	 just	as	easily	call	 them	something	else.)	
The	artifact	is	intended	as	a	prompt	for	further	activity.	Others	come	
along	and	engage	with	the	artifact,	letting	it	prompt	them	into	an	ac-
tivity	 whose	 contours	 are	 partially	 determined	 by	 that	 artifact.	 And	
then	those	participants	appreciate	the	aesthetic	qualities	which	arise	
in	their	own	actions.	This	schema	differs	sharply	from	the	first	schema	
2.	 Many	 deny	 that	 all	 art	 is	 made	 for	 aesthetic	 reasons.	 I	 do	 not	 mean	 to	 be	
claiming	that	all	art	must	be	made	only	for	aesthetic	reasons.	I	only	mean	to	
be	suggesting	that,	in	the	category	of	the	aesthetically	oriented	arts,	there	are	
two	sorts.	 I	 leave	the	notion	of	“aesthetic	reasons”	purposefully	vague	here,	
and	I	 intend	my	account	to	be	compatible	with	any	number	of	ways	of	fill-
ing	this	out.	I	myself	favor	Dominic	Lopes’	recent	account,	which	focuses	on	
considerations	of	aesthetic	value	that	bear	on	aesthetic	actions	(Lopes	2018,	
32–36).	Another	useful	account,	which	my	discussion	is	compatible	with,	is	
(Gorodeisky	and	Marcus	2018).	
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is	good	because	it	has	induced	and	encouraged	me	to	be	graceful,	and	
helped	to	shape	the	form	of	my	grace.5 
I	will	assume,	for	the	remainder	of	this	paper,	that	there	can	be	aes-
thetic	qualities	in	one’s	own	actions	—	that	process	aesthetics	is	real.	I	
have	argued	for	this	possibility	at	length	elsewhere,	drawing	especially	
on	recent	work	in	the	aesthetics	of	bodily	movement	(Nguyen	2019a;	
2020,	especially	101–120	).6	Furthermore,	the	recent	conversation	on	
the	aesthetics	of	the	everyday	has	also	begun	to	explore	the	aesthet-
ics	of	actions,	as	they	emerge	in	ordinary	activity.	The	conversation	in	
everyday	aesthetics	has	charted	the	aesthetic	qualities	of	such	actions	
as	scratching	an	itch	or	doing	housework	(Irvin	2008a,	2008b;	Saito	
2007,	2015;	Lee	2010).	
Crucially,	though	philosophers	have	begun	to	think	about	process	
aesthetics,	they	have	largely	ignored	the	possibility	of	process	art.	Ev-
eryday	aesthetics	has	focused	on	the	aesthetics	of	more	spontaneous,	
agent-driven	 activities.	 It	 has	 ignored	 the	 possibility	 that	 we	 might	
make	 artifacts	 in	 order	 to	 shape	 experiences	 of	 process	 aesthetics.	
Theorists	 of	 everyday	 aesthetics	 seem	 to	 presume	 that	 process	 aes-
thetics	 is	 somehow	 incompatible	 with	 the	 practices	 of	 art-making.	
Elsewhere,	 theorists	have	 investigated	art	 forms	 that	 seem	rife	with	
5.	 I	will	not	fill	out	the	notion	of	an	“aesthetic	property”,	for	I	wish	my	account	
to	be	compatible	with	a	wide	variety	of	theories.	I	have	attempted	to	ensure,	
at	the	very	least,	that	my	account	is	compatible	with	the	views	that	aesthetic	
properties	are	recognized	through	judgments	of	taste;	that	attributing	them	
requires	first-personal	acquaintance;	that	recognizing	aesthetic	properties	in	
an	object	requires	correctly	perceiving	features	in	that	object;	and	that	aes-
thetic	properties	merit	the	perceptions	of	them.
6.	 Much	 of	 this	 work	 has	 been	 made	 possible	 by	 earlier	 work	 on	 bodily	 per-
ception	and	the	possibility	of	an	aesthetics	of	bodily	senses,	including	work	
on	 proprioceptive	 experiences	 of	 dance	 (Montero	 2006).	 Also	 crucial	 has	
been	 work	 rejecting	 the	 requirement	 that	 all	 aesthetic	 experiences	 be	 sen-
sory,	much	of	it	emanating	from	work	on	conceptual	art.	(Schellekens	2007)	
provides	an	excellent	overview	of	that	terrain,	and	a	convincing	argument	for	
the	possibility	of	the	aesthetic	experience	of	ideas.	Notice	that	the	category	
of	 aesthetics	 of	 actions	 is	 a	 much	 larger	 one	 than,	 say,	 that	 of	 somaesthet-
ics,	which	concentrates	specifically	on	the	internal	aesthetics	of	bodily	move-
ment	and	excludes,	say,	the	internal	aesthetics	of	doing	logic	or	playing	chess	
(Shusterman	2012).
process	aesthetics	of	rock	climbing	lies	in	how	the	rock	climber	sees	
the	rock,	when	they	are	looking	to	it	as	obstacle	and	means	for	forward	
progress.	
Process	aesthetics	permeates	our	lives,	often	emerging	as	a	part	of	
our	natural,	 spontaneous,	and	unsculpted	everyday	activity.	When	 I	
swerve	 around	 an	 unexpected	 obstacle	 in	 the	 road,	 I	 might	 delight	
in	the	elegance	and	beautiful,	swift	precision	of	my	response.	When	I	
finally	figure	out	the	solution	to	a	philosophical	puzzle	that	has	been	
plaguing	me,	I	can	do	so	through	clumsy,	ugly,	brute-force	reasoning,	
or	I	might	alight	directly	on	the	solution	with	a	wonderfully	precise	
turn	of	mind.	Some	actions,	of	course,	are	aesthetically	evaluable	from	
the	outside	and	the	inside.	The	grace	of	a	dancer’s	movement	may	be	
evident	both	to	the	inner	kinesthetic	sense	and	to	the	outside	observ-
er’s	eye.	But	some	aspects	of	acting	are	primarily	available	to	the	acting	
agent	themselves:	what	it	feels	like	to	choose,	to	decide,	to	originate	
an	action,	 to	respond	to	a	changing	environment.	The	sense	of	 free-
dom	or	constraint	engendered	by	a	game	environment	or	an	urban	
landscape	 is	 one	 available	 primarily	 to	 the	 navigating	 agent.	 These	
various	experiences	of	agency	and	skill	are	the	special	provenance	of	
process	aesthetics.
	But,	 I	will	argue,	we	can	also	shape	these	experiences	as	part	of	
an	intentional	artistic	practice.	The	process	arts,	then,	are	the	arts	in	
which	artifacts	are	made	for	the	sake	of	bringing	about	first-personal	
aesthetic	experiences	of	mental	and	physical	processes.3	I	will	contrast	
process	art	with	object	art,	which	I	take	to	be	the	dominant	form	in	
high	art	culture	—	at	least	in	the	art	cultures	descended	from	the	West-
ern	European	tradition.	In	object	art,	the	aesthetic	properties	adhere	to	
the	artistic	artifact.	In	process	art,	the	aesthetic	properties	adhere	pri-
marily	to	the	processes	and	activities	of	the	actor,	as	instigated	or	influ-
enced	by	the	artifact.4	In	object	art,	the	artwork	is	good	in	virtue	of	its	
being,	say,	graceful.	In	process	art,	it	is	I	who	am	graceful;	the	artwork	
3.	 Though	I	focus	on	aesthetically	oriented	process	art,	I	have	written	the	defini-
tion	so	as	to	be	open	to	the	possibility	of	non-aesthetic	process	art.
4.	 I	intend	no	connection	to	Whitehead’s	“process	philosophy”.
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The	historical	inattention	to	the	process	arts	has	left	a	number	of	
key	questions	unanswered.	Who	is	the	artist	in	process	art?	How	do	
they	imbue	an	artifact	with	the	capacity	to	shape	a	resulting	activity?	
Who	is	responsible	for	the	aesthetic	qualities	of	action	—	the	artist	or	
the	active	audience?	 In	what	 follows,	 I	offer	a	 theory	of	 the	process	
arts	and	make	first	attempts	at	answering	these	questions.	I	argue	that	
the	process	arts	are	a	viable,	and	important,	category	of	the	arts.	I	give	
a	 general	 account	 of	 the	 basic	 difference	 between	 process	 arts	 and	
object	 arts,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 prescribed	 focus	 of	 aesthetic	 attention.	 I	
give	an	account	of	the	place	of	the	artist	in	the	process	arts,	and	argue	
that	we	can	often	attribute	significant	responsibility	for	the	aesthetic	
qualities	 of	 an	 audience	 member’s	 action	 to	 an	 artist.	 And	 I	 defend	
the	process	arts	from	various	skeptical	claims.	Finally,	I	take	the	first	
steps	towards	diagnosing	the	resistance	to	process	art.	This	analysis,	I	
hope,	will	also	expose	some	basic	presuppositions	engendered	by	the	
largely	object-centered	history	of	our	artistic	practice.	
One	last	note:	I	use	the	term	‘art’	here	for	lack	of	a	better	term,	but	
I	 am	 not	 particularly	 attached	 to	 it.	 For	 my	 purposes,	 the	 important	
claims	 are	 that	 we	 humans	 engage	 in	 practices	 of	 making	 artifacts	
for	aesthetic	purposes;	and	 that	 there	are	 two	distinctive	categories	
of	those	artifacts,	one	of	which	has	been	theoretically	neglected.	And	
furthermore,	that	we	have	neglected	the	possibility	that	we	can	create	
artifacts	to	intentionally	bring	about	aesthetic	experiences	of	activity.	
When	I	say	that	the	social	tango,	games,	and	cities	deserve	to	be	called	
“arts”,	I	mean	that	they	deserve	to	take	up	a	place	in	the	pantheon	of	
human-created	artifacts,	created	for	aesthetic	purposes.	My	goal	is	to	
investigate	and	give	an	account	of	these	artifacts.	I	will	make	a	case	
that	 these	 artifacts	 are	 quite	 similar	 to	 the	 traditional	 object	 arts	 in	
some	 very	 important	 regards,	 and	 that	 some	 of	 the	 most	 cherished	
features	of	the	object	arts	also	occur	in	the	process	arts.	But	I	will	not	
rigorously	defend	my	use	of	the	term	‘art’	beyond	pointing	out	these	
similarities.	If	the	reader	wishes	to	reserve	the	term	‘art’	for	what	I’m	
calling	 the	 “object	 arts”,	 and	 wishes	 to	 use	 some	 other	 term	 for	 the	
process	 qualities.	 The	 academic	 discussion	 of	 videogames	 as	 an	 art	
form,	as	we	will	see,	has	typically	focused	on	object-qualities,	such	as	
fixed	story,	graphics,	and	music,	and	ignored	the	aesthetic	qualities	of	
player	choice	and	skilled	player	action.	In	order	to	render	such	objects	
legible	 to	 the	established	 terms	of	discourse,	conventional	aesthetic	
theory	has	largely	ignored	their	process	aesthetic	qualities.	
Philosophical	aesthetics,	then,	seems	to	behave	as	if	there	are	only	
two	options:	either	there	can	be	process	aesthetics,	but	not	in	art;	or	
there	can	be	art,	but	denuded	of	process	aesthetics.	In	other	words,	the	
discussion	seems	 to	presume	that	 there	can	be	no	process	art.	Why	
might	 that	 be?	 Yuriko	 Saito	 makes	 a	 compelling	 suggestion	 in	 her	
account	of	everyday	aesthetics.	With	ordinary	external	objects,	 says	
Saito,	we	can	clearly	delineate	what	we	are	supposed	to	focus	our	at-
tention	on.	But	with	actions,	the	aesthetic	qualities	are	too	variable	to	
support	 any	 intersubjectively	 stable	 experiences.	 We	 can	 all	 look	 at	
the	same	external	object,	but	we	each	have	our	own	different	activi-
ties.	It	thus	seems	very	difficult	to	have	any	sort	of	critical	discourse	or	
make	any	sort	of	objective	aesthetic	judgment	of	our	own	actions.	And	
making	such	objective	aesthetic	 judgments	and	having	such	shared	
experiences	are	the	foundations	of	the	practice	of	art.	So,	says	Saito,	to	
embrace	the	aesthetics	of	action,	we	must,	for	that	space,	abandon	the	
demands	of	art	(Saito	2007,	18–26;	Saito	2015).	
Here	is	where	my	account	differs	sharply.	I	think	we	can	use	arti-
facts	to	shape	aesthetic	activity	in	a	way	that	is	significantly	like	the	
traditional	arts.	 Furthermore,	 those	artifacts	 help	 to	 stabilize	 certain	
experiences	of	action	and	make	them	more	intersubjectively	sharable.	
The	aesthetics	of	action	are	not	simply	confined	to	everyday	activity;	
they	 can	 be	 intentionally	 called	 forth	 and	 sculpted	 through	 artistic	
practice.	There	can	be	arts	of	action.7 
7.	 I	 don’t	 mean	 here	 to	 require	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 an	 artifact	 align	 with	 the	
designer’s	intent.	A.	W.	Eaton	provides	a	useful	account	of	the	“function”	of	
an	artifact,	by	which	the	function	is	set	by	etiological	facts	about	use	and	the	
procedures	by	which	artifacts	evolve	(Eaton	forthcoming).
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fixed	narratives.	In	doing	so,	the	theoretical	discussion	excludes	pro-
cess	aesthetics,	concentrating	instead	on	the	object-aesthetic	qualities	
that	might	be	found	in	the	artifact	itself.	This,	I	suggest,	is	due	to	the-
oretical	baggage	 from	art	culture’s	historical	emphasis	on	the	object	
arts,	and	the	relative	paucity	of	developed	tools	for	thinking	about	the	
process	arts.8 
A	 survey	 of	 various	 theoretical	 approaches	 to	 games	 will	 serve	
here	as	a	useful	case	study,	to	help	us	to	get	a	grip	on	the	dominance	
of	 the	object	art	paradigm.	Some	 theorists	have	 focused	on	 the	 rep-
resentational	qualities	of	 the	game.	For	example,	 Ian	Bogost	praises	
those	games	that	make	arguments	through	procedural	rhetoric:	 that	
is,	games	that	comment	on	social,	political,	and	economic	systems	by	
simulating	them	in	a	pointed	way	(Bogost	2010).	 John	Sharp	has	ar-
gued	that	videogames	can	become	art	when	they	move	beyond	pro-
moting	 mere	 player	 absorption	 in	 the	 instrumentalities	 of	 play,	 and	
start,	instead,	to	represent	the	world	in	a	meaningful	way.	Sharp,	for	
example,	points	to	Mary	Flanagan’s	game	Career Moves,	which	repro-
duces	the	old	family	game	The Game of Life,	while	forcing	players	with	
female	pawns	to	make	stereotypically	gendered	career	choices.	Flana-
gan’s	game,	says	Sharp,	is	art,	because	it	brings	the	player	to	reflect	on	
gender	biases	in	the	world	(Sharp	2015).	Flanagan	herself	has	argued	
that	games	can	become	art	when	they	start	to	perform	the	functions	
of	 much	 contemporary	 art	—	such	 as	 offering	 social	 critiques	 (Flana-
gan	2009).	The	pattern	of	argument	here	is	clear:	for	games	to	be	an	
art,	there	must	be	some	sort	of	valuable	representational	content	that	
we	 can	 attribute	 to	 the	 game	 itself.	 Notice	 that	 in	 all	 of	 these	 cases,	
the	valuable	qualities	that	make	the	game	art	are	attributable	to	the	
artifact	itself	—	its	mechanics,	its	representation	of	the	world,	and	the	
commentary	 embedded	 in	 the	 rules	 of	 its	 simulation.	 Here,	 the	 art-
status	 of	 videogames	 is	 defended	 by	 ignoring	 any	 process	 qualities	
and	focusing	solely	on	the	object	qualities.	A	similar	form	of	argument	
also	occurs	in	the	fast-growing	literature	which	treats	games	as	a	kind	
8.	 This	paragraph	is	a	brief	summary	of	an	extended	account	I	have	developed	
of	game	aesthetics	elsewhere	(Nguyen	2019a;	Nguyen	2020).
higher-level	category	of	“artifacts	manufactured	for	aesthetic	reasons”,	
they	may	feel	free	to	substitute	the	term	of	their	choice	throughout.	
2. Games, tango, cooking, cities
It	will	be	useful	to	step	back	from	philosophical	theorizing	for	a	mo-
ment	 and	 survey	 some	 representative	 process	 arts.	 First,	 games	 are	
clear	examples	of	a	process	art.	I	mean	games	in	the	broad	sense,	in-
cluding	 board	 games,	 sports,	 videogames,	 and	 tabletop	 role-playing	
games.	Games	are	often	made	for	the	sake	of	the	player’s	experience	of	
their	own	play:	their	controlling	an	avatar	through	carefully	timed	se-
quences	of	difficult	jumps;	their	thinking	through	complex	sequences	
of	moves;	and	the	grace	and	precision	of	their	complex	reactive	move-
ments.	Part	of	the	player’s	experience	also	involves	their	practical	ex-
periences	of	the	object	as	it	is	relevant	to	the	player’s	activity	—	like	the	
speed	and	shape	of	obstacles	hurtling	at	them	in	a	videogame.	
Obviously,	many	games	also	have	traditional	object-aesthetic	qual-
ities.	When	we	praise	the	graphics	of	a	game	for	their	beauty	or	gran-
deur,	we	are	attributing	aesthetic	properties	 to	an	object	as	 it	exists	
independently	of	our	activity.	But	a	very	significant	amount	of	game	
design	effort	goes	into	shaping	the	player’s	experience	of	active	play.	
Game	designers	sculpt	a	choice	space	and	an	action	space	which	give	
players	 an	 opportunity	 for	 rich,	 interesting	 choices,	 for	 thrilling	 ac-
tions,	 for	 graceful	 movement.	 Game	 designers	 often	 also	 neatly	 co-
ordinate	the	process	and	object	qualities,	as	a	claustrophobic	choice	
space	and	a	desperate	set	of	obstacles	might	be	matched	to	similarly	
ominous	music	and	visual	design.	Note	that	the	practice	of	game	de-
sign	and	game	criticism,	as	it	is	found	in	the	wild,	is	largely	focused	on	
the	experiential	elements	of	active	play.	The	discourse	that	naturally	
arises	in	the	practice	of	creating	and	appreciating	games	often	involves	
richly	aesthetic	language.	The	natural	talk	about	games	clearly	treats	
games	 as	 a	 process	 art.	 However,	 when	 we	 move	 to	 the	 theoretical	
discussion	 of	 game	 aesthetics,	 and	 various	 attempts	 to	 demonstrate	
that	games	are	a	valuable	form	of	art,	the	discussion	usually	switches	
to	object-aesthetic	elements	—	like	graphics,	sound,	fixed	scripts,	and	
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Games	should	also	draw	our	gaze	to	other	kinds	of	choice	space	—	of	
environments	designed	to	support	the	free	movement	and	decision	of	
agents.	Urban	planning	is	also	a	process	art,	at	least	in	part.	Think	of	
the	difference	between	the	miserable	experience	of	navigating	a	cer-
tain	kind	of	modern	American	metropolitan	sprawl,	full	of	sameness	
and	repetition,	compared	to	the	rich	and	lively	experience	of	navigat-
ing	 a	 city	 like	 Istanbul,	 full	 of	 lovely	 winding	 streets	 and	 delightful	
mazes	 of	 back	 alleys	 and	 market	 paths.	 Some	 of	 this	 delight	 arises	
from	object-aesthetic	qualities,	such	as	the	visual	quality	of	the	archi-
tecture	and	the	street.	But	a	day	wandering	the	streets	of	Istanbul	is	
also	one	replete	with	interestingly	textured	navigational	choices	—	of	
noticing	and	discovering	a	hidden	passageway,	of	deciding	to	take	the	
broad,	curving	street	or	to	enter,	instead,	the	cool,	dark	labyrinth	of	an	
indoor	marketplace.	The	 layout	of	 the	city	 conditions	 the	quality	of	
these	choices.10 
hand,	non-philosophical	discussion	of	games	often	focuses	on	the	aesthetics	
of	 actions.	 We	 find	 such	 discussion	 in	 designers’	 diaries	 and	 in	 online	 re-
views	of	games	—	that	is,	in	the	natural	practice	of	the	aesthetic	appreciation	
of	games	itself.	I	discuss	those	critical	practices	in	greater	detail	in	(Nguyen	
2019d).	Jon	Robson	does,	in	fact,	discuss	the	aesthetics	of	videogame	perfor-
mances	—	though	his	discussion	is	confined	to	the	question	of	whether	such	
performances	are	aesthetically	evaluable,	and	does	not	broach	the	topic	of	
how	the	work	of	 the	game	designer	might	shape	 the	aesthetic	qualities	of	
such	 performances	 (Robson	 2018).	 Notably,	 some	 writers	 outside	 of	 philo-
sophical	aesthetics	have	directed	attention	to	the	aesthetics	of	action,	most	
notably	 Jesper	 Juul	 (Juul	 2004,	 2013).	 Importantly,	 some	 work	 in	 the	 field	
of	game	studies	has	started	to	explore	the	process	aesthetics	of	games.	For	
examples,	see	Daniel	Vella’s	work,	which	occurs	at	the	intersection	of	literary	
studies	and	continental	aesthetics	(Vella	2016),	Graeme	Kirkpatrick’s	discus-
sion	of	videogames	from	the	perspective	of	continental	aesthetics	and	criti-
cal	theory	(Kirkpatrick	2011),	and	Veli-Matti	Karhulahti’s	work	on	timing	in	
videogames,	again	from	a	continental	perspective	(Karhulahti	2013).	Notably,	
all	of	these	discussions	draw	heavily	on	traditions	of	continental	aesthetics.	
What’s	particularly	interesting	here	is	the	degree	to	which	philosophical	aes-
thetics	in	the	analytic	tradition	has	largely	ignored	process	aesthetics	entirely	
in	the	discussion	of	games	as	an	art	form.	
10.	 The	 phenomenology	 of	 city	 walking	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 much	 study,	
though	 most	 of	 it	 outside	 of	 analytic	 aesthetics.	 For	 an	 overview	 of	 conti-
nental	 and	 phenomenological	 work	 on	 city	 strolling,	 see	 (Paetzold	 2013).	
Jonathan	Maskit	offers	a	phenomenological	account	of	urban	aesthetics,	as	
conditioned	by	mobility	and	transportation	technologies	(Maskit	2018).
of	fiction.	Here,	we	are	directed	to	focus	our	aesthetic	appreciation	not	
on	qualities	in	our	own	actions,	but	on	fictional	qualities	in	the	work	
itself.	In	The Art of Videogames,	Grant	Tavinor	claims	that	videogames	
are	art	because	they	are	a	kind	of	fiction.	His	account	locates	the	pri-
mary	aesthetic	qualities	of	videogames	in	stable	features	in	the	artifact,	
such	as	the	narrative,	characters,	and	story.	These	are	features	attribut-
able	to	the	object	—	the	videogame	itself	—	rather	than	to	the	player’s	
actions.	 The	 player’s	 activity	 shows	 up	 in	 Tavinor	 simply	 as	 means	
to	 further	 the	 ends	 of	 immersion	 in	 the	 fiction.	 A	 player’s	 struggles	
with	 the	challenges	of	 the	game	are	 supposed	 to	help	 the	player	 to	
identify	with	the	struggles	of	their	in-game	avatar.	The	player’s	activ-
ity	is	supposed	to	aid	in	their	absorption	in	the	fiction	(Tavinor	2009). 
Dominic	Lopes	offers	a	similarly	object-oriented	account	of	the	art	of	
computer	games.	If	computer	games	are	an	art,	says	Lopes,	they	are	a	
form	of	interactive	computer	art.	Importantly,	says	Lopes,	interactive	
computer	art	does	not	prescribe	 that	 the	user	pay	attention	 to	 their	
own	actions.	Instead,	the	user	is	interacting	in	order	to	explore	a	pos-
sibility	space,	to	bring	the	algorithm	into	view.	As	Lopes	says,	the	user	
does	attend	to	their	own	activity,	but	only	as	a	means	to	appreciating	
the	actual	artwork.	The	actual	artwork	is	the	algorithm	and	the	possi-
bility	space	it	creates;	we	look	through	our	own	actions	in	order	to	get	
a	handle	on	 the	proper	object	of	aesthetic	appreciation.	And	notice	
that	 the	algorithm	 is	a	 stable	object	created	by	an	artist.	 Interacting	
with	the	computer	art	doesn’t	create	the	object	of	aesthetic	attention;	
it	is	something	like	a	digital	version	of	walking	around	and	through	a	
large	sculpture.	They	are	the	actions	that	we,	the	audience,	must	take	
to	bring	the	artist’s	work	into	view	(Lopes	2010,	36–52,67–84).	Notice	
that,	 in	 all	 these	 treatments,	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 art	 of	 games	 has	
avoided	any	direct	treatment	of	process	aesthetics.	I	take	this	to	be	a	
serious	omission,	one	driven	by	an	attempt	to	squeeze	games	into	a	
theoretical	framework	that	has	been	built	to	suit	object	art.9
9.	 This	 discussion	 of	 the	 videogames	 literature	 is	 merely	 a	 sketch	 of	 a	 much	
more	 detailed	 discussion	 I’ve	 offered	 elsewhere	 (Nguyen	 2017b;	 Nguyen	
2020).	For	another	take	on	that	literature,	see	(Tavinor	2010).	On	the	other	
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spontaneous	way,	where	you’re	free	to	invent	and	they’re	
free	to	invent	and	you’re	neither	one	hampering	the	oth-
er	—	that’s	 a	 very	 pleasant	 social	 form.	 (Kaltenbrunner	
1984,	11)
Contact	 improvisation	 is	 also	 a	 practice	 primarily	 oriented	 towards	
the	inner	experience	of	the	dancer,	rather	than	some	outward	display.	
This	is	why,	as	some	have	noted,	beginning	contact	dancers	often	cre-
ate	spectacular	performances,	but	experienced	contact	dancers	can	be	
quite	boring	to	watch.	Experienced	dancers	are	dancing	for	an	inner	
sensation	and	a	felt	relationship,	and	not	for	an	outer	observer.	In	fact,	
the	contact	improvisation	community	has	frequently	spurned	the	tra-
ditional	performer/audience	division,	preferring	to	hold	open	contact	
jams,	and	to	stage	performances	so	that	audience	members	can	feel	
free	to	join	in	(27,	37–38).	
Consider,	 too,	 the	neglected	aesthetics	of	activity	 in	 culinary	 life.	
There	is	an	aesthetics	of	movement	in	and	around	food,	as	conditioned	
by	the	physicality	of	the	dish.	Some	dishes	are	uncomfortably	plated,	
like	many	of	those	teetering	food	towers	so	popular	in	the	fancy	dining	
of	recently	bygone	days,	which	looked	stunning	but	were	physically	
annoying	to	eat	(Nguyen	2018).	The	process	of	cooking,	too,	is	full	of	
aesthetic	delight,	from	the	gorgeous	aromas	of	a	simmering	braise	to	
the	lovely	sizzle	of	vegetables	hitting	oil.	And	many	of	these	aesthetic	
experiences	are	distinctively	agential.	There	is	an	interaction	between	
one’s	sensual	awareness	of	the	ingredients	—	how	they	smell	and	look	
and	sound	as	they	simmer	and	fry	—	and	one’s	cooking	choices,	as	in-
formed	by	that	awareness.	
Food	writer	John	Thorne	suggests	that	modern	food	culture	sepa-
rates	the	process	of	food	creation	from	the	eating	itself,	and	socializes	
us	to	think	that	the	food	creation	is	just	a	chore	—	a	mere	instrument	to	
the	central	aesthetic	experience	of	the	finished	product.	
However,	 cooking	 at	 its	 most	 primal	 is	 not	 consciously	
instructed	 labor	 but	 a	 flowing,	 attentive	 reverie.	 Spear	
a	chunk	of	meat	on	a	skewer	and	hold	 it	over	a	bed	of	
Other	process	arts	center	on	a	designed	social	practice.	Consider,	
for	example,	the	inward	aesthetics	of	rapport	in	the	social	tango.	Im-
portantly,	says	Beatriz	Dujovne,	 the	 theatrical	stage	 tango,	which	so	
many	of	us	are	familiar	with	from	the	movies,	is	something	of	a	mis-
leading	imitation.	The	true	tango,	she	says,	is	the	social	tango,	which	is	
improvised	and	intimate.	In	the	social	tango,	the	dancers	aren’t	danc-
ing	for	the	eyes	of	an	audience.
They	 improvise.	 They	 dance	 for	 themselves,	 introspec-
tively.	 Shunning	 the	 external	 world,	 their	 eyes	 turn	
inward.	 This	 circumspect	 dance	 comes	 from	 a	 differ-
ent	heart	and	culture	than	the	stage	tango.	….	At	social	
dances	we	see	neither	sexual	passion	nor	violence.	The	
dance’s	form	is	different	as	well.	Legwork	is	minimal;	feet	
are	kept	on	the	floor;	the	size	of	the	steps	is	small.	People	
dance	closely	embraced	to	one	another,	bodies	connect-
ing,	chests	close	together,	heaving	and	retreating	with	ev-
ery	breath,	heads	 resting	delicately	 together,	moving	as	
one,	immersed	in	total	improvisation	that	forbids	them	to	
hide	 behind	 choreographed	 steps.	 Beauty	 radiates	 from	
the	 emotions	 inside	 the	 dancers,	 not	 from	 external	 dis-
plays	of	skill.	(Dujovne	2011,	5–6)
True	 tango	dancers	dance	 for	 themselves.	They	appreciate	 their	 rap-
port	with	 their	partner,	 the	sense	of	connection	and	responsiveness,	
the	absorption	in	the	collective	improvisation	of	movement.	
Similarly,	 consider	contact	 improvisation,	a	dance	 form	 in	which	
the	 dancers	 play	 with	 gravity	 by	 putting	 their	 weight	—	and	 their	
trust	—	on	 another	 person,	 rolling	 around	 each	 other’s	 bodies	 and	
perpetually	falling	towards	each	other	(Bigé	2017).	Steve	Paxton,	the	
dancer	who	originated	the	practice,	explains:
Just	 the	 pleasure	 of	 moving	 and	 the	 pleasure	 of	 using	
your	 body	 is,	 I	 think,	 maybe	 the	 main	 point.	 And	 the	
pleasure	of	dancing	with	somebody	in	an	unplanned	and	
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details	of	the	pot,	and	the	implicit	rules	of	its	use,	that	structure	those	
interactions.	(Ruth	Van	Waerebeek	recalls,	in	her	lovely	Belgian	cook-
book,	her	childhood	family	ritual	of	having	Belgian	waffles	for	dinner.	
The	part	 she	 remembers	with	 the	most	 fondness	and	nostalgia,	 she	
says,	was	 the	hours-long	argument	amongst	 the	 twelve	members	of	
her	family,	all	gathered	around	their	single	waffle-maker,	about	who	
had	 the	 rights	 to	 the	next	waffle	[Waerebeek	1996].)	 If	one	 thought	
that	there	could	be	an	aesthetic	experience	of	social	interaction,	then	
this,	 too,	 is	 surely	a	process-aesthetic	experience	conditioned	by	an	
artifact	and	its	rules	for	usage.11	And	surely	the	social	interactions	are	
conditioned,	in	significant	part,	by	the	rules	of	the	practice,	and	by	the	
particular	preparation	and	layout	of	the	dishes	and	material.	
	Obviously,	in	many	of	these	cases,	process	and	object	aesthetics	
are	deeply	intermingled.	Part	of	the	quality	of	a	Turkish	breakfast	is	cer-
tainly	in	the	gustatory	quality	of	the	ingredients	themselves.	However,	
critical	and	aesthetic	talk	in	the	culinary	realm	seems	entirely	focused	
on	the	object-aesthetic	qualities	—	the	taste	and	aroma	of	the	food	it-
self	—	and	not	on	the	process-aesthetic	qualities.	But	a	life	with	food	is	
a	life	full	of	process	aesthetics.	And	many	of	these	qualities	arise	from	
intentionally	designed	features.	Our	critical	practice,	however,	largely	
elides	the	process-aesthetic	features.	In	reviewing	restaurants,	we	usu-
ally	talk	about	the	food’s	taste,	smell,	and	appearance,	but	almost	nev-
er	talk	about	how	the	physical	arrangement	of	the	food	made	our	own	
manipulation	of	it	pleasing	or	awkward	—	though	how	that	movement	
goes	is	clearly	the	result	of	the	kitchen’s	attentiveness	or	 inattentive-
ness	to	the	forms	of	movement	which	will	be	called	forth	by	how	they	
arrange	and	plate	the	food.	In	reviewing	cookbooks,	we	often	talk	of	
the	recipe’s	resulting	deliciousness	or	appearance,	but	rarely	talk	about	
how	fun	or	annoying	it	was	for	us	to	cook	the	dish	—	about	whether	
the	processes	described	were	elegant,	where	the	times	and	activities	
fit	just	right;	or	whether	they	were	jumbled	messes,	where	we	were	
required	to	do	six	things	at	once	and	jump	frenetically	between	them.	
11.	 For	discussion	of	the	aesthetics	of	social	 interactions,	see	(Bourriaud	2002;	
Bishop	2004,	2012;	Finkelpearl	2013).
smoldering	charcoal.	It’s	not	conscious	thought	but	a	con-
tinual	 tension	 between	 the	 fire’s	 hunger	 and	 your	 own	
that	 directs	 the	 sharp-eyed	 turning,	 keeping	 sear	 from	
turning	altogether	into	char	as	the	fat	bubbles	and	pops,	
the	 juices	sizzle	and	crust,	and	the	odors	of	smoke	and	
meat	swirl	about	your	head.	(Thorne	1992,	29–30)
This	realization,	suggests	Thorne,	might	bring	you	to	change	how	and	
why	 you	 cook.	 Following	 a	 good	 recipe	 with	 painstaking	 precision	
might	lead	to	a	better	finished	product,	but	that	subservience	also	robs	
the	cooking	process	of	much	of	its	richness.	Cooking	more	improvisa-
tionally	may	sacrifice	a	bit	of	quality	in	the	end	product,	but	it	offers,	
in	trade,	a	much	more	rewarding	experience	of	one’s	own	agency	in	
cooking.
Other	 food	practices	are	built	around	the	pleasures	of	 the	eater’s	
agency.	 Take,	 for	 example,	 the	 joys	 of	 Turkish	 breakfast.	 Traditional	
Turkish	breakfast	is	a	composed	arrangement	of	small	dishes,	meant	to	
be	freely	combined:	small	blocks	of	feta	cheese,	olives,	jams,	spreads,	
fresh	bread,	eggs,	and	perhaps	a	bit	of	sausage.	One	of	the	key	plea-
sures	 of	 the	 meal	 lies	 in	 the	 experience	 of	 culinary	 free	 choice	—	of	
getting	to	decide	and	construct	each	next	bite	according	to	the	whim	
of	the	moment.	But	that	experience	of	free	culinary	activity	is	condi-
tioned	by	the	details	of	the	layout	of	the	breakfast.	When	the	spread	
has	been	well-assembled,	the	process	of	assembly	is	full	of	small	de-
lights:	the	cubes	of	cheese	are	the	right	size	to	have	with	a	bit	of	bread;	
the	spreads	are	just	the	right	density	to	scoop.	
What’s	 more,	 many	 food	 rituals	 structure,	 through	 their	 physical-
ity	 and	 the	 surrounding	 social	 norms,	 a	 set	 of	 movements,	 a	 social-
ity,	and	a	choice	space.	Consider	the	familiar	rituals	of	hot	pots	and	
raclette	machines,	in	which	large	groups	of	cheerful	eaters	cook	their	
meal	at	the	table,	swishing	slices	of	meat	through	liquid,	or	pouring	a	
bit	of	sizzling	melted	cheese	over	cubed	potatoes.	During	the	process,	
they	rub	shoulders,	argue	about	whose	piece	is	whose,	or	whose	turn	
it	is	to	grab	a	particular	piece	of	cooking	real	estate.	It’s	the	physical	
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represent	and	depict,	and	so	acquire	meaningfulness	(Korsmeyer	1999,	
103–145).	Such	attempts	do	indeed	survey	some	valuable	aesthetic	ter-
rain.	But	the	overall	approach	also	distracts	us.	They	focus	on	fitting	
the	process	arts	within	an	object	art	paradigm,	and	pull	our	attention	
away	from	these	forms’	unique	potential.	Ignoring	process	aesthetics	
and	process	art	is	a	poor	use	of	the	aesthetic	resources	of	the	world.	
It	is	my	hope	that	the	following	account	will	help	us	come	to	plainer	
terms	with	the	process	arts	and	their	value.	
Finally,	 I	 focus	 largely	on	pure	examples	—	artifacts	and	practices	
that	are	almost	entirely	object	art	or	process	art.	But	this	 focus	is	 in-
tended	only	to	help	us	start	to	get	a	grip	on	these	categories.	Actual	
artistic	practice	 is	 full	of	all	 sorts	of	hybrids	between	 the	 two	 forms.	
Many	videogames	invite	process-aesthetic	appreciation	of	the	player’s	
own	 actions,	 but	 also	 object-aesthetic	 appreciation	 of	 the	 graphics,	
the	music,	and	pre-generated	elements	of	storyline.	And	such	features	
can	harmonize	and	blend	in	fascinating	ways,	as	when	a	videogame’s	
soundtrack	 dynamically	 adjusts	 to	 the	 player’s	 actions,	 emphasizing	
the	drama	and	danger	of	 the	situation.	And	 I	 suspect	 that	 there	are	
many	artistic	practices	that,	though	object-centric,	also	have	substan-
tial	 process-aesthetic	 qualities.	 For	 example:	 our	 involvement	 with	
detective	 novels	 typically	 involves	 not	 only	 appreciation	 of	 object-
features	 like	 character	 and	 plot,	 but	 a	 self-reflective	 appreciation	 of	
our	own	process	of	puzzling	through	the	mystery.	And	when	we	try	to	
understand	the	aesthetic	value	of	such	a	hybrid	work	within	a	theory	
built	only	 for	 the	object	arts,	 then	we	will	 inevitably	misunderstand	
key	features	of	that	work.	
3. Process art: A theory
First,	 I	 define	 process aesthetics	 as	 the	 aesthetics	 of	 activity	 from	 the	
perspective	of	 the	actors.	This	 includes	 the	overtly	self-reflective	ex-
periences	of	each	actor’s	own	activity.	Process	aesthetics	also	includes	
those	experiences	of	 the	outside	world	 that	are	related	to	 that	activ-
ity	—	such	as	a	cook	monitoring	 the	smells	and	sounds	and	color	of	
their	 sautéing	 vegetables,	 to	 determine	 when	 they’re	 ready.	 Process	
But	the	activity	of	cooking	is	itself	part	of	the	content	of	a	cookbook.	
The	activity	of	cooking	is	a	product	of	intentional	design,	attributable	
to	 a	 cookbook’s	 author.	 One	 might	 then	 protest	 that	 the	 object-aes-
thetic	qualities	are	 the	genuinely	 important	ones,	while	 the	process	
qualities	are	just	a	side-show.	But	this	simply	begs	the	question	of	why	
we	favor	the	object	arts	over	the	process	arts	—	of	why,	in	so	many	of	
the	artifacts	 that	have	both	object	and	process	art	qualities,	we	con-
centrate	our	critical	discourse	on	the	object	qualities.	
All	 of	 my	 examples	 lie	 at	 the	 periphery	 of	 what	 is	 normally	 con-
sidered	art,	and	belong	to	practices	that	are	rarely	granted	the	respect	
generally	accorded	to	 the	 traditional	arts.	This	 is	part	of	 the	point.	 I	
think	the	historical	focus	on	the	object	arts	has	induced	a	relative	ne-
glect,	 in	 official	 attention	 and	 valuation,	 to	 the	 process	 arts.	 This	 is	
why	we	cannot	proceed	merely	by	interrogating	our	intuitions	about	
the	use	of	terms	like	‘art’,	for	those	have	been	shaped	by	the	very	cul-
tural	patterns	which	I	mean	to	question.12	I	freely	grant	that	the	norms	
and	practices	of	the	art	world,	at	present,	usually	ennoble	the	object	
arts	 and	 marginalize	 the	 process	 arts.	 I	 grant,	 furthermore,	 that	 our	
intuitions	 about	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘art’	 often	 support	 the	 primacy	
of	the	object	arts.	I	wish	to	question	the	basis	of	these	intuitions	and	
practices.	
Much	of	the	previous	work	on	this	terrain	has	argued	for	the	worth-
whileness	 of	 these	 various	 process	 arts	 by	 attempting	 to	 assimilate	
them	to	more	familiar	object	arts.	Consider,	for	example,	Michael	de	
Certeau’s	aesthetic	analysis	of	walking	in	the	city	as	a	kind	of	textual	
creation,	by	arguing	that	various	walks	could	be	interpreted	as	a	kind	
of	expressive	speech	(Certeau	1984,	91–95);	Bogost’s	and	Flanagan’s	
defenses	of	the	worth	of	games	in	terms	of	their	abilities	to	model,	cri-
tique,	and	comment	on	society,	economics,	and	morality;	and	Carolyn	
Korsmeyer’s	account	of	the	meaning	of	food	in	terms	of	its	capacity	to	
12.	 For	 a	 more	 robust	 defense	 of	 moderate	 skepticism	 towards	 the	 usefulness	
of	interrogating	our	intuitions	about	the	term	‘art’,	see	(Zangwill	2007,	1–35).	
Richard	Wollheim’s	work	is,	in	my	eyes,	an	excellent	example	of	careful	theo-
ry	building	which	takes,	as	its	starting	points,	intuitions	about	artworks	which	
implicitly	exclude	the	process	arts	(Wollheim	1980).
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refer	to	the	enactor’s	activities	in	response	to	such	an	artifact	as	their	
‘engagement’	with	it.	None	of	these	notions	are	meant	to	be	exclusive;	
many	artworks	have	both	process-	and	object-aesthetic	qualities,	and	
an	individual	can	appreciate	both	at	once.16 
Process	 art	 involves	 a	 more	 distanced	 relationship	 between	 art-
ist	and	enactor	than	object	art	does	between	artist	and	audience.	In	
the	 object	 arts,	 the	 artist	 creates	 a	 work	 which	 the	 audience	 experi-
ences.	The	audience	experiences	aesthetic	properties	as	in	or	adhering 
to	 that	 work,	 and	 makes	 aesthetic	 judgments	 about	 that	 work.	 Pro-
cess	art	involves	an	extra	stage.	The	designer	creates	an	artifact.	The	
enactors	 interact	with	the	artifact,	which	conditions	the	enactors’	 re-
sulting	activity.	The	enactors	experience	aesthetic	properties	in	their	
own	 actions	 (“That	 was	 a	 graceless	 serve”;	 “We	 were	 so	 beautifully	
in	synch	with	each	other	in	that	dance”).	The	artifact	influences	what	
and	how	aesthetic	properties	emerge	in	the	enactor’s	activity,	but	the	
primary	aesthetic	properties	emerge	in	the	enactor’s	activity	itself.	We	
may	 also	 make	 secondary	 judgments	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 work	
based	on	its	functional	capacity	to	encourage	aesthetically	valuable	ac-
tions.	We	might	judge	this	board	game	good	because	it	tends	to	create	
situations	that	are	interesting,	thrilling,	fascinating,	and	tends	to	cre-
ate	opportunities	for	our	own	brilliant,	dramatic,	and	elegant	moves.	
But	the	goodness	of	process	art	as	such	comes	down	to	its	capacity	to	
encourage	valuable	aesthetic	qualities	in	the	enactor’s	own	activity.17 
16.	 I	 originally	 introduced	 the	 terms	 ‘object	 art’,	 ‘process	 art’,	 ‘enactor’,	 ‘artist’s	
work’,	and	‘attentive	focus’	in	a	very	brief	sketch	in	my	book,	Games: Agency as 
Art	(Nguyen	2020,	142–144).	Though	Games	bears	a	similar	publication	date	
to	the	present	article,	due	to	the	complexities	of	book	publishing,	those	parts	
of	 the	 book	 were	 actually	 written	 several	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 writing	 of	 the	
present	article.	In	the	interim,	I’ve	grappled	with	a	wider	variety	of	process	
arts.	The	present	account	departs	from	the	earlier	one	in	many	details.	I	take	
the	present	account	of	process	art	to	be	much	improved	from	the	preliminary	
sketch	I	gave	in	Games.	Furthermore,	I	take	myself	to	have	answered,	in	the	
present	article,	some	of	the	open	questions	and	puzzles	I	mentioned	in	Games 
about	the	nature	of	process	art,	and	the	questions	concerning	its	lowly	place	
in	the	culture.	
17.	 I	am	relying	here	on	Jane	Forsey’s	account	of	the	aesthetics	of	design	(Forsey	
aesthetics	thus	includes	experiences	of	sensory	and	aesthetic	qualities	
in	external	objects	as	they	are	cognized	as	part	of	the	activity.	Consider,	
for	example,	the	aesthetics	of	a	rock	climb.	Process-aesthetic	qualities	
include	 the	 climber’s	 aesthetic	 experiences	 of	 their	 own	 movement,	
but	also	the	aesthetic	experiences	involved	in	perceiving	the	rock	as	
obstacle	for	movement	and	as	means	for	aiding	movement.	I	attend	to	
those	external	qualities	that	are	relevant	for	my	activity,	and	I	attend	
to	them	as	part	of	an	 investigative	and	practical	process	where	they	
function	as,	among	other	things,	the	basis	for	further	decisions	and	ac-
tions.	There	is	an	aesthetic	quality	—	a	perception	of	a	kind	of	practical	
harmony	—	that	arises	from	recognizing	that	this	little	nubbin	of	rock	
is	exactly	in	the	right	place	to	re-balance	your	foot.13 
Process art	refers	to	those	artifacts	whose	function	is	to	bring	about	
process-aesthetic	experiences.	I	mean	‘artifacts’	loosely	here	—	I	mean	
to	include	manufactured	physical	objects,	rituals,	instruction	sets,	and	
even	social	practices.	The	rules	of	the	party	game	Werewolf	are	an	ar-
tifact,	in	this	sense;	as	are	the	conventions,	traditions,	and	practices	of	
social	tango;	as	well	as	the	physical	apparatus	of	fondues,	along	with	
the	social	norms	for	their	appropriate	use.	I	will	refer	to	the	creators	
of	process	art	as	the	designers.	The	designer	here	can	be	anything	from	
a	single	individual,	such	as	a	board	game	designer,	to	a	multi-gener-
ational	community,	 such	as	 the	one	 that	originated	 the	social	 tango	
practice.14	 I	will	call	 ‘the	enactor’	 the	person	or	persons	who	engage	
with	such	an	artifact,	whose	actions	are	appropriately	guided	or	insti-
gated	by	it,	and	who	aesthetically	appreciate	their	own	activity.15	I	will	
13.	 For	a	further	discussion	of	practical	harmony,	see	(Nguyen	2020,	107–110).
14.	 For	a	discussion	of	how	groups	can	be	artists,	see	(Bacharach	and	Tollefsen	
2010;	Nguyen	2019c).
15.	 I	intend	no	connection	to	Alva	Noe’s	enactive	aesthetics.	Furthermore,	though	
I	will	usually	speak	of	single-person	enactors,	I	am	entirely	open	to	the	pos-
sibility	of	group	agent	perspectives	—	though	 I	do	not	want	 to	 litigate	here	
for	the	possibility	of	multi-person	perspectives	for	aesthetic	experience.	Note	
that	(Himberg	et	al.	2018)	argues	that	the	point	of	collective	dance	improvisa-
tion	is	to	induce	a	collective	perspective	from	which	collective	self-reflective	
aesthetic	experiences	can	be	had.	See	also	my	discussion	of	collective	audi-
ences	in	(Nguyen	2019c).
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the	spectator.	A	chess	player	makes	a	complex	decision;	the	elegance	
of	their	solution	can	be	grasped	by	an	observer	who	understands	the	
state	of	play.	Certainly,	some	process-aesthetic	qualities	are	available	
to	 the	 spectator.	But	many	process-aesthetic	qualities	are	not.	What	
it	 feels	 like	 to	 react,	how	exactly	 the	pieces	of	 the	solution	come	 to	
you	—	these	 are	 qualities	 to	 which	 the	 agent	 themselves	 has	 special	
access.	
More	importantly,	however,	my	claim	is	not	that	the	attentive	focus	
in	the	process	arts	must	be	private.	My	claim	is	only	that	the	process	
arts	 are	 aimed	 primarily	 at	 an	 agent’s	 experience	 of	 their	 own	 activ-
ity.	This	means	that	there	is	no	requirement	for	externalizability	and	
no	demand	for	publicity	for	the	aesthetic	qualities	—	though,	of	course,	
some	aspects	of	that	activity	might	turn	out	to	be	publicly	accessible.	
Let’s	return	to	rock	climbing.	Some	rock	climbs	are	quite	aesthetically	
public,	with	spectacular	large-scale	gymnastic	movement.	Other	rock	
climbs	—	like	the	classic	balance	problem	The Angler	—	involve	minute	
shifts	of	balance	and	delicate	adjustments	in	inner	torsion,	invisible	to	
the	outside	eye.	The Angler is	fascinating	to	climb,	but	mind-numbingly	
boring	to	watch	(Nguyen	2017a).	My	claim	here	is	only	that	rock	climb-
ing	is	primarily	oriented	towards	the	aesthetic	qualities	of	climbing	for	
the	climber	themselves;	thus,	The Angler is	no	aesthetic	failure	because	
of	the	relative	absence	of	aesthetic	payoff	for	the	spectator.	Consider,	
also,	 the	 differences	 between	 a	 more	 object-art	 dance	 practice,	 like	
ballet,	 and	 a	 more	 process-art	 dance	 practice,	 like	 the	 social	 tango.	
Though	there	may	be	process-aesthetic	qualities	to	ballet,	the	practice	
is	oriented	primarily	towards	producing	aesthetic	qualities	available	to	
the	non-dancing	spectator.	This	is	why,	under	the	current	social	prac-
tice,	 it	doesn’t	seem	a	viable	aesthetic	criticism	of	a	particular	ballet	
performance	that	it	was	thoroughly	unpleasant	for	the	dancers.	And	
though	there	may	be	some	observable	aesthetic	qualities	in	the	social	
tango,	 the	 practice	 is	 freed	 from	 the	 demand	 that	 it	 must	 primarily	
aim	at	producing	such	observable	qualities.	The	practice	is	designed	
primarily	for	the	sake	of	producing	the	subtle	feelings	of	connection	
With	process	art,	there	is	a	significant	gap	between	the	work	and	
the	 aesthetic	 experience	—	much	 more	 so	 than	 with	 object	 art.	 This	
requires	making	a	conceptual	distinction	between	two	aspects	of	art-
works	that	are	usually	merged.	In	object	art,	we	aesthetically	attend	to	
what	the	artist	produces.	Melville	writes	the	text	Moby Dick,	and we	
aesthetically	attend	to	that	very	same	text.	To	understand	process	art,	
we	must	dissolve	the	expectation	for	such	a	singular	locus	of	aesthetic	
effort.	 Let’s	 distinguish	 between	 the	 designer’s work	 and	 the	 attentive 
focus.	The	designer’s	work	is	the	stable	artifact	created	by	the	designer	
for	 the	purpose	of	engendering	aesthetic	experiences.	The	attentive	
focus	is	the	prescribed	focus	of	aesthetic	attention.	In	object	art,	the	
designer’s	work	and	the	attentive	 focus	are	one	and	the	same	thing,	
or	very	close	 to	 it.	The	painter	creates	a	painting,	and	 the	audience	
attends	to	that	painting.	In	process	art,	the	designer’s	work	and	the	at-
tentive	focus	come	apart.	The	designer’s	work	is	the	artifact:	the	game,	
the	recipe,	 the	city,	 the	rules	of	 the	tango.	The	attentive	focus	 is	 the	
enactor’s	own	activity,	which	arises	in	response	to	the	designer’s	work.	
In	process	art,	there	are	two	distinct	generative	processes:	first	the	de-
signer	generates	the	work,	and	then	the	enactor	generates	an	activity	
in	 response	 to	 the	 work.	 And	 in	 process	 art,	 it	 is	 that	 latter	 activity	
which	is	prescribed	as	the	attentive	focus.18
One	might	worry	that	I	am	presuming	some	special	private	interi-
ority	of	agency	—	some	inaccessible	first-personal	perspective	for	the	
agent.	This	might	strike	some	as	problematic.	At	 the	very	 least,	one	
might	 protest,	 aesthetic	 qualities	 of	 agency	 are	 sometimes	 available	
to	an	outside	viewer.	The	basketball	player	dodges	and	weaves,	and	
the	gracefulness	of	their	motion	is	available	both	to	themselves	and	to	
2013)	and	Glenn	Parsons	and	Allen	Carlson’s	account	of	 functional	beauty	
(Parsons	and	Carlson	2008).
18.	 One	might	think	that	the	divide	between,	say,	composer	and	performer	can	
be	mapped	onto	the	divide	between	artist	and	enactor.	This	turns	out	not	to	
work;	see	Andrew	Kania’s	excellent	discussion	(Kania	2018).	Note	that	even	
when	performance	art	ontologies	are	divided	into	multiple	stages	(the	script,	
the	performance),	there	is	still	some	further	audience,	beyond	the	performer,	
who	attribute	aesthetic	properties	to	an	external	work.
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recalcitrant	 texts,	 such	as	Thomas	Pynchon’s	 famously	cryptic	novel	
Gravity’s Rainbow,	may	also	highlight	 the	reader’s	own	struggles	and	
the	experiential	qualities	of	so	struggling.	But	that	is	just	to	say	that	
fictions	sometimes	cross	the	line	between	object	arts	and	process	arts.	
It	may	turn	out,	once	we	have	performed	our	analysis,	that	many	of	
the	traditional	arts	actually	partake	more	of	process	aesthetics	than	we	
might	have	thought.
Finally,	the	object	and	process	arts	occur	on	a	continuum.	For	ex-
ample,	there	are	certain	intentional	process	qualities	in	the	traditional	
arts.	From	my	own	experience	playing	piano,	I	suspect	that	Beethoven	
cared	not	a	whit	about	the	experience	of	the	piano	player.	His	interest	
was	solely	on	the	finished	product.	But	Chopin’s	piano	works	have	al-
ways	seemed	different	to	me.	The	physical	movements	that	each	piece	
requires	have	an	expressive	resonance	with	the	music	itself.	Bold	pas-
sages	 require	 athletic	 leaps	 of	 the	 pianist’s	 hands;	 elegant	 melodies	
are	often	paired	with	movements	that,	when	executed,	feel	physically	
elegant;	agonized	chords	force	the	fingers	to	twist	in	a	grotesque	and	
agonizing	manner.	If	this	is	right,	then	Beethoven’s	piano	sonatas	are	
object	art,	but	Chopin’s	piano	works	are	a	mixture	—	they	have	some	
clear	process	art	qualities	that	are	accessible	only	to	the	piano	player.20 
Similarly,	consider	some	of	the	differences	between	various	practices	
of	dance.	Some	practices	of	dance,	 such	as	ballet,	 are	 largely	 in	 the	
domain	of	object	art,	where	others,	 like	 the	social	 tango,	are	 largely	
in	the	domain	of	process	art.	But	surely	there	are	ballet	dancers	who	
dance	primarily	 for	 their	own	 inner	experience	of	dance,	and	social	
tango	dancers	who	dance	for	the	outside	eye.	I’m	classifying	ballet	as	
an	object	art	and	social	tango	as	a	process	art	from	what	seem	like	the	
overall	aims	of	the	practice.	But	the	boundaries	are	fluid,	and	individu-
als	may	enter	into	the	practices	for	different	reasons.	My	intention	is	
not	to	show	that	the	object	arts	and	the	process	arts	are	always	distinct	
from	each	other.	Rather,	it	is	to	show	that	the	process	art	side	of	the	
20.	For	a	further	discussion,	see	(Willard	2018).
and	improvisational	responsiveness	that	are	primarily	appreciable	by	
the	dancers	themselves.	
Alternately,	 one	 might	 attempt	 to	 refuse	 the	 distinction	 between	
the	object	and	process	arts	by	pointing	to	the	fact	that	an	audience’s	
appreciation	of	an	object	artwork	involves	a	substantial	amount	of	ac-
tivity.	Audiences	for	the	traditional	arts	are	not	passive,	as	has	been	
often	pointed	out.	We	choose	what	to	attend	to;	we	question	and	inter-
pret.	For	example:	experiencing	fiction	involves	a	substantial	deploy-
ment	 of	 the	 active	 imagination.	 Note,	 however,	 that	 no	 matter	 how	
active	the	role	of	the	imagination,	critical	talk	of	fiction	usually	attri-
butes	aesthetic	properties	and	judgments	to	the	text	itself	and	not	to	
one’s	imagination	of	it.	Furthermore,	if	one	loses	oneself	in	one’s	own	
imagination,	 that	 attention	 is	 usually	 directed	 towards	 the	 fictional	
world	as	imagined,	and	not	self-reflectively	towards	the	mental	efforts	
of	 imagining.	In	other	words,	 in	many	encounters	with	fiction,	even	
if	 the	audience	participates	 in	the	manufacture	of	an	attentive	focus,	
they	 still	 grapple	 with	 it	 as	 something	 produced.	 Their	 appreciative	
focus	is	on	the	world	produced	by	their	imagination,	and	not	on	their	
own	process	of	coming	to	imagine	it,	nor	on	the	relationship	between	
that	world	and	the	process	of	imagining	it.19 
Consider,	too,	the	precise	target	of	our	critical	discourse.	When	we	
praise	Jane	Austen’s	novels,	we	praise	them	for	their	wonderfully	ex-
act	descriptions	of	characters.	This	 is	an	object-aesthetic	attribution;	
the	quality	of	precision	is	attributed	to	the	novel	and	not	one’s	own	
mental	efforts	in	response.	This	is	not	true	of	all	fiction,	however.	Con-
sider,	 for	 example,	 more	 game-like	 fictions,	 such	 as	 mystery	 novels.	
There,	 it	 seems,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 fiction	 encourages	 attention	 to	
the	reader’s	own	struggles.	When	we	praise	a	good	mystery	novel,	we	
often	praise	it	for	giving	us	a	juicy	puzzle	to	sink	our	teeth	into.	Other	
19.	 I	am	confining	my	discussion	here	to	those	theories	of	the	object	arts	which	
presume	that	the	work	of	art	 is	some	external	artifact.	 I	 take	this	to	be	the	
dominant	view,	and	 the	most	plausible	one.	Some	other	accounts,	such	as	
that	 of	 R.	G.	 Collingwood,	 claim	 that	 the	 work	 of	 art	 is	 constructed	 in	 the	
imagination	of	the	viewer	(Collingwood	1938).	Space	does	not	permit	me	to	
address	that	family	of	views	here.
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However,	there	is	a	very	different	sort	of	relationship	between	the	
setter	of	a	rock-climbing	route	and	the	aesthetic	qualities	that	emerge	
in	a	climber	of	that	route.	The	route	setter	can	aim	at	instigating	grace-
ful	motion;	they	can	set	the	size	and	difficulty	of	the	holds	to	encour-
age	delicacy	in	the	climber.	In	many	cases,	process	artists	do	have	par-
ticular	artistic	qualities	or	values	in	mind,	and	they	imbue	their	work	
with	features	that	play	some	direct	role	in	shaping	the	aesthetic	qual-
ity	of	the	enactor’s	activity	—	even	if	the	process	artist	doesn’t	entirely	
determine	 that	 aesthetic	 quality	 in	 its	 full	 specificity.	 The	 designers	
of	 Microsoft	 Word	 had	 nothing	 like	 wildness	 or	 hilarity	 in	 mind.	 A	
climbing-route	setter,	on	the	other	hand,	may	set	a	climb	specifically	
for	the	purpose	of	encouraging	graceful,	delicate,	aesthetically	pleas-
ing	motion	—	though	the	precise	form	of	grace	is	finalized	only	by	a 
particular	climber.
It	will	be	useful	here	to	consider	Sondra	Bacharach	and	Deborah	
Tollefsen’s	 discussion	 of	 artistic	 collaboration.	 Some	 artworks,	 like	
movies,	are	made	by	a	group	artist.	But	what	are	the	outer	boundaries	
of	 that	group	artist?	One	might	 think	that	anybody	that	contributed	
at	all	to	the	aesthetic	quality	of	the	end	product	was	part	of	the	group	
artist.	But	this	is	too	broad	a	criterion;	it	does	not	distinguish	between	
genuine	artistic	 collaborators	and	mere	contributors.	Obviously,	 say	
Bacharach	 and	 Tollefsen,	 the	 directors,	 script-writers,	 cinematogra-
phers,	actors,	and	set	dressers	are	part	of	the	group	artist,	but	the	on-
set	caterers	are	not.	How	do	we	draw	that	 line	 in	a	principled	way?	
Their	answer	is	that	the	group	artist	is	constituted	by	its	members	tak-
ing	on	a	 joint	commitment	 to	collaboratively	fix	particular	aesthetic	
qualities	in	the	work.	They	intentionally	cooperate	to	make	a	film	deli-
cate	or	spooky.	The	caterer’s	tacos	may	have	helped	the	director	make	
good	artistic	choices,	but	the	tacos’	cook	didn’t	play	a	role	in	intention-
ally	fixing	the	particular	aesthetic	qualities	of	the	film	(Bacharach	and	
Tollefsen	2010).	
Their	analysis	helps	us	to	identify	who	the	process	artist	is,	exact-
ly	—	and	how	that	designation	may	fall	in	different	places	for	different	
process	arts.	The	designers	of	Microsoft	Word	don’t	play	a	collaborative	
spectrum	has	been	neglected,	as	have	the	process	aspects	of	many	tra-
ditional	arts.
4. Who is the process artist?
Who	is	the	artist	of	a	work	of	process	art	—	the	designer	or	the	enactor?	
One	might	be	tempted,	at	this	point,	to	suggest	that	I’ve	put	the	labels	
in	the	wrong	places.	Perhaps	the	designers	of	games,	cities,	and	Turk-
ish	 breakfasts	 are	 simply	 creating	 the	 background	 and	 the	 tools	 for	
artistry.	The	designers	aren’t	any	sort	of	artists	at	all.	Instead,	it	is	the	
enactors	—	the	players,	walkers,	and	diners	—	who	are	the	true	artists.	
This	 does	 seem	 quite	 apt	 for	 some	 cases.	 It	 seems	 precisely	 the	
right	characterization	of,	for	example,	the	social	tango.	There,	the	so-
cial	practice	simply	enables	a	kind	of	live,	artistic,	creative	process.	The	
dancers	themselves	seem	primarily	responsible	for	the	aesthetic	quali-
ties	that	emerge	in	the	dance.	The	designers	of	the	social	practice,	such	
as	they	are,	are	responsible	for	creating	a	fertile	ground	for	aesthetic	
creation,	but	not	for	the	aesthetic	creation	itself.	It	would	seem	strange	
to	think	of	those	designers	as	any	sort	of	artists	or	artist-analogues.	
But	the	view	that	the	enactors	are	the	artists	seems	quite	inapt	for	
other	cases:	for	instance,	many	board	games	and	computer	games.	For	
example,	the	enactors-as-artists	view	doesn’t	have	the	resources	to	ac-
count	 for	 the	difference	 in	aesthetic	 responsibility	between,	say,	 the	
designers	of	a	computer	game	versus	the	designers	of	a	word-process-
ing	program.	The	team	that	designs	a	word	processor	is	making	the	
tools	 for	 other	 artists	 to	 write	 their	 various	 artistic	 masterpieces	 on.	
But	surely	the	designer	of	the	word	processor	isn’t	an	artist.	They	don’t	
have	 anything	 like	 particular	 artistic	 values	 or	 aesthetic	 qualities	 in	
mind	as	they	design	the	software.	They	are	not	active	participants	in	
the	act	of	artistic	creation.	Suppose	that	Paul	Beatty	wrote	his	novel	The 
Sellout	using	a	copy	of	Microsoft	Word.	The	aesthetic	qualities	of	The 
Sellout are	wildness,	bleak	hilarity,	and	expressive	bitterness.	None	of	
these	specific	aesthetic	qualities	can	be	attributed	to	Microsoft	Word	
or	its	design	team.	
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the	relationship	between	a	film’s	scriptwriter	and	its	production	team.	
The	scriptwriter	creates	a	document	and	passes	it	to	a	production	team,	
who	are	 inspired	by	 that	document	 to	some	further	activity.	Superfi-
cially,	this	might	seem	like	the	same	kind	of	multi-stage	affair	as	with	
process	art.	However,	in	film-making,	the	scriptwriter	and	production	
team	are	both	focused	on	getting	aesthetic	qualities	into	the	same	end-
stage	artifact	—	the	film	—	for	appreciation	by	some	further	audience.	
The	primary	aesthetic	qualities	here	occur	in	that	finished	work	itself.	
The	scriptwriter	isn’t	focused	on	structuring	and	influencing	the	aes-
thetic	qualities	of	 the	production	team’s	activity	of	creation.	A	game	
designer,	on	the	other	hand,	is	designing	precisely	for	the	sake	of	the	
aesthetic	qualities	of	the	player’s	activity	of	play.	
Second,	 an	 artistic	 collaboration	 usually	 involves	 both	 collabora-
tors	aiming	at	a	 shared	goal	—	the	production	of	an	aesthetic	object	
with	certain	aesthetic	qualities.	But	the	goals	of	the	designer	and	enac-
tor	are	often	quite	divergent.	The	designer	of	Portal might	be	designing	
for	the	sake	of	imbuing	the	player’s	experience	with	these	particular	
aesthetic	qualities,	while	the	player	themselves	might,	during	play,	be	
wholly	aimed	at	winning.	Often,	the	player	generates	those	aestheti-
cally	infused	actions	when	their	mind	is	bent	wholly	to	the	practical	
considerations	 of	 the	 game-task;	 the	 aesthetic	 qualities	 are	 uninten-
tional	by-products	of	their	attempts	to	win.22	Similarly,	the	city-walker	
may	simply	be	 intending	to	find	something	 to	eat	 for	 the	night;	 the	
aesthetic	qualities	in	their	activity	arise	from	an	interaction	between	
their	local	goal	and	the	navigational	qualities	of	the	city.	In	many	cases	
of	process	art,	it	is	the	designer	who	aims	at	bringing	about	aesthetic	
experiences.	The	enactor	 pursues	 some	other	 aim,	 like	winning	 the	
game	or	finding	a	late-night	snack.	For	the	enactor,	the	aesthetic	quali-
ties	can	arise	 indirectly,	as	a	 result	of	activity	aimed	at	 some	 locally	
22.	 In	some	cases,	the	player	may	have	initially	decided	to	play	the	game	for	the	
sake	 of	 aesthetic	 experience,	 but	 during	 game-play,	 they	 are	 not	 choosing	
their	 particular	 action	 in	 order	 to	 generate	 those	 particular	 aesthetic	 quali-
ties.	Rather,	those	aesthetic	qualities	arise	out	of	wholly	instrumental	inten-
tions	and	actions,	as	conditioned	by	their	gaming	environment.	See	(Nguyen	
2019a)	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	aesthetic	qualities	and	agential	layering.
role	in	fixing	the	aesthetic	qualities	of	The Sellout.	Furthermore,	no	ele-
ments	in	Word	play	a	significant	role	in	fixing	the	particular	aesthet-
ic	qualities	of	The Sellout.	Word	may	have	contributed	to	that	work’s	
quality	by	making	Beatty’s	artistic	creative	life	easier,	but	the	particular	
aesthetic	properties	of	The Sellout	aren’t	significantly	explained	by	any	
particular	aspects	of	Word,	nor	by	any	choices	of	Word’s	design	team.	
Consider,	on	the	other	hand,	the	beloved	computer	puzzle	game	
Portal. In	that	game,	the	player	is	given	a	single	primary	tool:	a	worm-
hole	gun.	The	wormhole	gun	first	fires	an	orange	portal,	which	sticks	
to	wherever	you	aimed	it,	and	then	a	blue	portal.	Once	you’ve	attached	
these	two	portals	to	the	world,	the	game	connects	them	with	a	worm-
hole.	You	can	go	in	one	portal	and	you’ll	instantly	exit	out	the	other.	
Manipulation	of	the	portal	placements	lets	you	manipulate	the	topol-
ogy	of	the	virtual	environment.	The	game	then	places	an	increasingly	
difficult	 set	 of	 obstacles	 in	 your	 virtual	 path,	 which	 you	 must	 solve	
with	only	your	wormhole	gun.	Solving	these	puzzles	is	a	fascinating,	
mind-bending	delight,	in	which	gorgeous	solutions	finally	emerge	for	
the	player	out	of	 frustrated	despair.	Notice,	 though,	 that	 the	aesthet-
ic	quality	of	the	player’s	activity	 in	Portal	are	partially	attributable	to	
design	elements	in	the	game	and	to	the	game	designer’s	 intentional	
efforts.	The	astonishing	feel	of	one’s	mind	finally	unlocking	a	puzzle	
arises	 in	 response	 to	 the	 counterintuitive	 physics	 and	 the	 details	 of	
each	particular	puzzle.	And	 these	parts	of	 the	game	were	surely	de-
signed,	at	least	in	part,	to	bring	about	the	particular	experiential	quali-
ties	of	that	mental	unlocking.
We	 might	 be	 tempted,	 then,	 to	 instead	 claim	 that	 the	 artist	 of	 a	
piece	of	process	art	and	the	enactor	are	actually	artistic	collaborators.21 
And	while	this	may	be	true	in	some	particular	cases,	I	do	not	think	we	
should	so	readily	subsume	the	relationships	of	artist	and	enactor	in	the	
process	arts	to	the	kinds	of	relationships	we	find	in	traditional	object	
art	collaborations.	First,	if	it	is	a	kind	of	collaboration,	then	it	is	one	of	
a	very	different	sort	from	traditional	artistic	collaborations.	Consider	
21.	 Such	 a	 view	 is	 advanced	 by	 Paul	 Crowther,	 who	 says	 the	 digital	 arts	 are	
unique	in	that	their	users	also	count	as	co-creators	(Crowther	2008).
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I	take	it	that,	in	the	case	of	tango,	the	aesthetic	insight	is	had	by	the	
enactor.	It	is	the	dancer	who	understands,	on	some	level,	that	moving	
like	so,	and	responding	like	so,	will	lead	to	graceful	movement	and	a	
wonderful,	 sensitive	 sense	 of	 connection.	 The	 creators	 of	 the	 social	
practice	have	not	had	the	aesthetic	insights	themselves;	they	have	cre-
ated	a	background	against	which	such	aesthetic	insights	might	more	
readily	flourish.	In	that	case,	I	think	we	can	say	that	the	primary	artist	
is	the	dancer.	The	designer’s	work	—	the	social	practice	of	tango	—	con-
stitutes	a	background	and	environment	for	encouraging	the	dancer’s	
process	artistry.	
In	the	case	of	many	computer	games,	on	the	other	hand,	the	aes-
thetic	insight	is	largely	held	by	the	designer.	It	is	Portal’s	designers	who	
realized	that	such-and-such	lines	of	code,	and	such-and-such	virtual	
physics,	will	create	such-and-such	physics	puzzle,	which	will	make	it	
significantly	likely	that	a	game	player	will,	in	solving	the	puzzle,	have	
an	aesthetic	experience	of	their	mind’s	own	elegance.	The	game	player	
may	have	an	insight	about	the	solution	to	the	puzzle,	but	that	is	not	
an	aesthetic	insight	in	Zangwill’s	sense.	During	their	absorption	in	the	
game,	 the	 players’	 attention	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 instrumental	 calcula-
tions	of	play.	It	is	the	game	designer’s	insight	that	a	certain	variety	of	
instrumental	calculations,	as	guided	by	particular	goals	and	rules	of	
physics,	will	result	in	certain	aesthetic	qualities	in	the	player’s	activity.23 
The	primary	artist	in	this	case	is	the	game	designer.
There	can	also	be	nested	aesthetic	insights.	For	example,	consider	
the	eater	of	a	Turkish	breakfast.	They	may	have	a	culinary	aesthetic	
insight:	that	a	certain	bit	of	feta	would	taste	great	when	balanced	with	
a	very	small	dollop	of	bergamot	jam.	They	then	bring	that	insight	into	
being,	in	the	form	of	a	particular	morsel	of	food.	They	are	the	artist	of	
that	morsel,	which	is	itself	a	piece	of	object	art.	But	the	process	of	cre-
ating	that	morsel	also	has	aesthetic	qualities,	and	the	aesthetic	nature	
of	 that	creative	process	was	conditioned	by	the	aesthetic	 insights	of	
23.	 For	a	further	discussion	of	the	focused,	goal-oriented	nature	of	play,	and	its	
relation	to	 the	emergent	aesthetic	experiences	of	play,	see	(Nguyen	2019a;	
2020).	
non-aesthetic	goal,	as	it	brings	them	into	interaction	with	the	process	
artist’s	design.	
Who	exactly	 is	 the	artist,	 then,	 in	a	given	piece	of	process	art?	 It	
will	 be	 useful	 here	 to	 consider	 Nick	 Zangwill’s	 account	 of	 aesthetic	
creation.	The	artist,	says	Zangwill,	is	the	person	who	has	an	aesthetic	
insight	—	an	insight	that	certain	aesthetic	properties	would	depend	on	
certain	non-aesthetic	properties	—	and	who	imbues	some	work	of	art	
with	those	aesthetic	properties	in	virtue	of	those	non-aesthetic	proper-
ties.	For	example,	an	artist	might	have	the	insight	that	a	certain	array	of	
colors	and	shapes	would	create	a	delicious	tension	in	a	painting.	They	
then,	based	on	that	insight,	create	a	painting	with	that	array	of	colors	
and	shapes,	and	so	give	 it	delicious	 tension	(Zangwill	2007,	36–58).	
Notice	that	the	definition	as	written	excludes	designers	of	process	art,	
since	they	do	not	imbue	the	work	itself	with	aesthetic	properties.	Rath-
er	they	design	a	work	with	the	capacity	to	trigger	a	particular	range	of	
aesthetic	qualities,	as	they	will	emerge	in	downstream	engagements.	
But	let	me	suggest	an	expansion	of	Zangwill’s	account:	
Expanded conception of the artist:	The	artist	is	the	per-
son	 who	 has	 an	 aesthetic	 insight	—	which	 is	 an	 insight	
that	certain	aesthetic	properties	would	depend	on	certain	
non-aesthetic	 properties	—	and	 who	 imbues	 some	 work	
of	art	with	aesthetic	properties	or the power to bring about 
those aesthetic properties	 in	 virtue	 of	 those	 non-aesthetic	
properties.	
I	have	emphasized	the	addition	I	have	made	to	Zangwill’s	account.	
The	expanded	conception	seems	utterly	reasonable	to	me.	It	captures	
something	essential	about	what	it	is	to	be	an	artist	engaged	in	an	act	
of	aesthetic	creation.	The	artist	has	some	particular	insight	into	how	
aesthetic	properties	might	emerge	from	non-aesthetic	properties;	and	
they	manipulate	some	non-aesthetic	medium	in	order	to	give	rise	to	
those	 aesthetic	 properties.	 The	 expanded	 conception	 only	 relaxes	
Zangwill’s	implicit	demand	that	those	aesthetic	properties	emerge	in	
the	work	itself.
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rules	and	methods	of	the	social	tango	as	part	of	the	explanation	of	the	
aesthetic	qualities	that	emerge	in	the	final	dance.	And	Microsoft	Word	
is	no	process	art	at	all.	The	designers	of	Word	did	not	design	specific	
parts	of	Word	in	order	to	bring	about	specific	aesthetic	qualities	of	the	
various	novels,	plays,	essays,	and	philosophy	articles	that	are	written	
with	it.	
5. The frame around the process
It	will	be	useful	to	compare	my	analysis	of	process	art	with	the	recent	
discussion	of	“everyday	aesthetics”.	Yuriko	Saito	contrasts	the	formal	
practices	of	art-making	and	art	appreciation	with	a	range	of	less	struc-
tured,	 more	 freeform	 aesthetic	 experiences	—	ones	 unconstricted	 by	
the	prescriptions	found	in	the	traditional	arts.	
Says	 Saito:	 in	 the	 standard	 practice	 of	 art,	 there	 is	 a	 prescriptive	
frame	around	works	of	art.	That	is,	there	are	prescriptions	for	a	proper	
encounter,	 in	which	we	must	approach	an	artwork	 in	a	 certain	way	
and	include	only	certain	properties	in	our	aesthetic	attention.	In	order	
to	experience	a	painting,	I	am	supposed	to	view	it	from	the	front	and	
not	the	side.	When	we	discuss	and	judge	a	novel,	we	are	supposed	to	
do	so	by	considering	the	meanings	and	sounds	of	the	words,	and	not	
the	smell	of	the	ink	and	paper	they	are	printed	on.	Such	prescriptions	
are	clearly	central	to	our	art	practices.	Simply	imagine	our	reaction	to	
someone	breaking	them	—	say,	by	pronouncing	on	the	aesthetic	quali-
ties	of	Diego	Rivera’s	painting	Flower Seller by	licking	the	canvas	and	
commenting	on	its	flavor.	
Let’s	 call	 anything	 that	 has	 such	 an	 attentional	 frame	 a	 “framed	
work”.	 Framed	 works	 involve	 prescriptions	 for	 appreciation.	 Many	
of	these	prescriptions	arise	through	practice	and	tradition.	We	know	
what	to	do	with	a	book	and	with	a	painting	from	the	way	their	appear-
ance	and	the	context	of	their	presentation	declare	their	membership	
in	 some	 prescription-bound	 class.	 In	 other	 cases,	 prescriptions	 are	
overtly	 declared	 by	 the	 artist,	 such	 as	 when	 a	 contemporary	 avant-
garde	 artist	 instructs	 their	 audience	 to	 roll	 around	 in	 their	 museum	
installation’s	 ball-pit	 as	 part	 of	 their	 experience	 of	 the	 work	 (Irvin	
the	person	who	set	up	the	Turkish	breakfast.	Those	insights	might	be,	
for	example,	that	this	size	of	feta	cube	would	be	more	pleasant	to	han-
dle	than	that	size,	and	that	this	arrangement	of	plates	would	generate	
the	most	elegant	movement	for	an	eater	in	the	process	of	assembling	
their	various	tasty	morsels.	The	person	who	sets	out	the	Turkish	break-
fast	spread	can	imbue	aesthetic	qualities	in	the	process	of	the	eater’s	
own	particular	process	of	aesthetic	creation.	In	other	words,	Turkish	
breakfast	is	an	object	art	nested	inside	a	process	art,	where	the	process	
artist	is	arranging	a	spread	in	order	to	design	an	aesthetically	valuable	
process	—	where	that	process	is	the	eater’s	activity	of	making	object	art.	
I	 suspect	 that	 there	 will	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 many	 other	 examples	 of	
such	nested	arts.	Consider,	for	example,	tabletop	role-playing	games	
and	improvisational	theater,	where	the	actors	or	players	are	creating	a	
piece	of	object	art	—	a	performed	narrative	—	but	doing	so	inside	a	rule	
set	which	makes	their	process	of	creation	itself	aesthetically	interest-
ing.	Role-playing	games	and	 improvisational	 theater	procedures	are	
process	artworks,	built	around	the	process	of	creating	object	art.	
Let	me	suggest,	then,	a	taxonomy.	With	regards	to	the	location	of	
the	artist,	there	are,	loosely,	three	types	of	process	arts.
Designer process arts:	the	arts	where	the	designer	has	the	
primary	aesthetic	insights.	
Enactor process arts:	the	arts	where	the	enactor	has	the	pri-
mary	aesthetic	insights.
Hybrid process arts: the	arts	where	the	designer	and	enac-
tor	 share	 the	 primary	 aesthetic	 insights	 (either	 through	
collaboration	or	through	a	multi-stage	nesting).
Portal	is	a	designer	process	art.	The	designer	had	the	insights	to	cre-
ate	the	game-physics	and	game-environment	in	a	certain	way,	in	order	
to	imbue	the	enactor’s	activity	with	certain	aesthetic	properties.	Social 
tango	is	an	enactor	process	art.	The	weight	of	 the	aesthetic	 insights	
is	borne	by	the	enactor.	It	is	a	process	art	because,	when	we	wish	to	
explain	these	aesthetic	qualities,	we	will	need	to	make	reference	to	the	
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for	ourselves	how	we	will	spend	it,	as	we	please.	We	can	constitute	the	
aesthetic	object	in	any	way	we	wish	(Saito	2007,	18–19).	
Let’s	accept	this	analysis	for	the	moment.	It	gets,	I	think,	at	some-
thing	crucial	about	what	we	care	about	in	art	in	particular	—	something	
about	why	the	aesthetics	of	art	are	distinctive	from	everyday	aesthetic	
experiences.	Art	involves	artifacts	and	social	practices	which	prescribe	
particular	approaches	to	those	artifacts.	The	point	of	all	that	rigmarole	
is	to	produce	certain	sculpted,	stable,	repeatable	experience	—	to	cap-
ture	an	aesthetic	property	 in	an	object,	 to	tie	 it	down	so	that	others	
may	see.	
So:	what	about	process	aesthetics?	For	Saito,	all	process	aesthetics	
is	everyday	aesthetics.	There	is	no	such	thing	as	a	framed	experience	
of	 process	 aesthetics.	 There	 is,	 in	 other	 words,	 no	 process	 art.	 Why	
reject	the	possibility	of	process	arts?	Saito’s	suggestion	is	interesting.	
The	art	world,	says	Saito,	wants	to	give	us	controlled	and	optimal	ex-
periences	of	art,	which	require	a	degree	of	physical	distance	and	physi-
cal	disengagement.	The	paradigmatic	experience	of	art	 is,	according	
to	Saito,	passive:	we	stand	still	in	front	of	the	painting;	we	sit	still	at	
a	concert	hall	(20).	Thus,	the	essential	active	participation	of	process	
aesthetics	might	seem	in	tension	with	the	controlled	nature	of	art.
Saito	 is	 surely	 right	 that	 our	 everyday	 experience	 is	 full	 of	 un-
framed	moments	of	process	aesthetics.	But	 I	do	not	 think	 it	 is	 right	
to	think	that	there	can	be	no	process	arts.	Processes,	I	argue,	can	also	
be	framed.	And	artists	can	exert	some	degree	of	control	over	the	aes-
thetics	of	activities,	even	when	there	is	no	physical	distance	between	
the	audience	member	and	their	own	activity.	This	is	easiest	to	see	in	
the	practice	of	game	criticism.	One	cannot	pronounce	a	critical	judg-
ment	of	a	videogame	merely	from	smelling	the	disc.	When	I	play	the	
videogame	Shadows of the Colossus, I	am	supposed	to	form	a	judgment	
of	the	game	by	aesthetically	attending	to	the	challenges	of	moving	my	
avatar	in	and	around	the	bodies	of	massive	giants.	I	am	not	supposed	
to	include,	in	my	evaluation,	how	satisfying	it	was	for	me	to	eat	pop-
corn	 between	 battles.	 Other	 forms	 of	 process	 art	 also	 involve	 some	
form	 of	 frame.	 The	 prescriptions	 involved	 with	 these	 practices	 may	
2005;	Davies	2004,	50–79).24	Importantly,	the	normative	force	of	these 
prescriptions	is	entirely	hypothetical;	there	is	no	reason	to	follow	the	
prescriptions	for	“reading	a	novel”	unless	one	intends	to	be	engaged	in	
the	practice	of	novel	reading.	The	prescriptions	only	specify	what	the	
work	is,	by	specifying	what	one	must	do	in	order	to	count	as	engaging	
with	the	work.	One	is	perfectly	free	to	enjoy	the	smell	of	one’s	copy	of	
Moby Dick	by	burning	it	in	a	fire,	but	one	is	not	thereby	appreciating	
Moby Dick. These	prescriptions	only	fix	the	nature	of	what	Moby Dick 
is:	it	is	not	a	piece	of	physical	material	to	be	appreciated	in	all	its	physi-
cality.	Nor	is	it	a	collection	of	words	to	be	accessed	at	any	order,	like	a	
dictionary.	The	work	consists	of	a	set	of	words to be read in a particular 
order.	Those	 instructions	 frame	 the	work,	 specifying	what	 it	 is,	over	
and	above	a	particular	set	of	material.	Everyday	aesthetics,	on	the	oth-
er	hand,	is	aesthetic	experience	without	officially	prescribed	frames.	In	
everyday	aesthetics,	says	Saito,	we	wander	through	the	world	framing	
and	re-framing	as	we	please.	
Why	do	we	frame?	The	prescriptive	frame	helps	stabilize	the	object	
of	attention.	It	is	part	of	what	makes	it	possible	for	different	audience	
members	to	have	something	like	the	same	experience.	The	rule	that	a	
novel	should	be	read	in	a	certain	order	—	all	the	words,	from	front	to	
back	—	helps	to	ensure	that	all	the	readers	are	looking	at	the	same	ba-
sic	narrative	object,	and	are	all	starting	from	approximately	the	same	
experiential	place.	But	that	means,	says	Saito,	that	there	is	a	trade-off	
between	art	aesthetics	and	everyday	aesthetics.	With	art,	we	have	a	
prescriptive	frame,	and	a	relatively	stabilized	and	relatively	sharable	
form	of	experience.	But	with	everyday	aesthetics	there	is	no	frame,	so	
we	lose	the	stable	object	and	the	sharable	experience.	What	we	gain,	
instead,	is	aesthetic	freedom.	In	everyday	aesthetics,	we	can	exercise	
our	 imagination	and	creativity	as	we	see	fit.	Rather	than	letting	con-
vention	 or	 social	 practice	 dictate	 our	 aesthetic	 attention,	 we	 choose	
24.	 Note,	as	Irvin	explains,	that	these	claims	do	not	violate	the	intentional	fallacy,	
since	they	don’t	depend	on	reference	to	private	internal	states,	but	only	on	
public	actions	and	declarations.
	 c.	thi	nguyen The Arts of Action
philosophers’	imprint	 –		18		– vol.	20,	no.	14	(may	2020)
agency,	rather	than	towards,	say,	certain	select	perceptual	qualities	of	
a	physical	object.	The	existence	of	framed	process	arts	is	what	permits	
the	sculpting	and	delineation	of	particular	activities,	and	 their	 trans-
mission	from	artist	to	audience.	It’s	what	permits	us	to	have	process-
aesthetic	experiences	that	are	something	like	shared	—	like	when	we	
ascend	the	same	rock	climb,	performing	similar	patterns	of	motion	in	
response	to	precisely	the	same	physical	challenges.	
Not	all	process	art	 involves	frames.	A	process	artwork,	according	
to	my	account,	is	some	artifact	made	for	the	purpose	of	shaping	the	
aesthetic	qualities	of	the	enactor’s	engagement.	We	can	easily	imagine	
artifacts	made	with	such	aesthetic	intent	but	with	no	frame.	I	suspect	
that	cities	are	such	unframed	works	of	process	art.	It	is	hard	to	think	
of	a	way	 to	attend	 to	 the	wrong	sorts	of	 features	 in	aesthetically	ap-
preciating	a	city.	So	long	as	one	is	aesthetically	appreciating	the	city,	
any	form	of	roving	aesthetic	attention	and	action	seems	permitted	in	
forming	an	aesthetic	judgment	of	the	city.	An	artifact	can	be	made	for	
the	 sake	 of	 conditioning	 the	 aesthetic	 quality	 of	 actions,	 even	 for	 a	
freely	 roving,	unframed	aesthetic	attention.	But	most	of	 the	process	
arts	I’ve	described	—	games,	cookbooks,	tango,	contact	improv	—	seem	
to	involve	frames.
Interestingly,	 much	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 frame	 in	 traditional	 works	
arises	from	practice-based	prescriptions.	We	know,	through	familiarity	
with	the	social	practice,	that	we	are	supposed	to	attend	to	the	words	
of	 the	 novel	 and	 not	 to	 its	 smell.	 However,	 some	 process	 arts	 offer	
what	we	might	call	a	 functional frame.	That	 is,	 the	enactor’s	attention	
is	 guided	 by	 the	 specification	 of	 some	 goal.	 Consider,	 for	 example,	
fly-fishing,	which	is	a	plausible	candidate	for	a	process	art.	Many	fly-
fishers	describe	a	kind	of	aesthetic	experience	that	arises	from	some	
gestalt	between	the	rhythms	of	their	casting,	their	attention	to	the	wa-
ter,	and	the	particular	mental	state	of	scanning	for	signs	of	the	trout.	
Notice	that	we	don’t	need	to	teach	a	fly-fisherman	social	prescriptions	
that	tell	them	to	attend	to	these	things	—	that	attention	arises	through	
the	instrumental	demands	of	the	goal	of	catching	fish	in	this	manner.
be	so	familiar	that	we	may	forget	their	existence,	but	they	are	easy	to	
bring	into	view.	Consider,	for	example,	if	I	were	to	pronounce	on	the	
poor	 texture	 of	 a	 restaurant’s	 broth	 after	 trying	 to	 eat	 it	 with	 a	 fork.	
This	is	an	illegitimate	judgment,	precisely	because	I	haven’t	attended	
to	the	work	while	following	the	appropriate	prescriptions.	These	pro-
cess	arts	are	appreciative	practices	whereby	we	frame	processes.	The	
social	practice	contains	prescriptions	which	seek	to	focus	various	par-
ticipants’	aesthetic	attention	on	the	same	set	of	features,	to	regularize	
and	focus	that	attention	in	controlled	and	repeatable	ways.	These	pre-
scriptions	usually	accompany	artifacts	that	have	been	intentionally	de-
signed	for	the	sake	of	such	aesthetic	attention.	And	it	is	the	coordina-
tion	of	the	prescriptions	and	the	artifact	design	that	can	give	the	artist	
some	measure	of	control	over	the	audience’s	experience,	and	provide	
for	some	stability	to	how	the	audience	interacts	with	the	artifact	and	to	
the	experiences	which	it	generates.	When	we	all	cluster	around	a	Viet-
namese	hot	pot	to	dip	our	various	meats	and	vegetables	in	the	bowl,	it	
is	no	accident	that	we	end	up	having	these	very	particular	experiences	
of	dipping	food,	dropping	food,	searching	desperately	around	for	our	
lost	shrimp,	bumping	elbows,	and	laughing.	The	conventions	of	the	
practice,	and	the	physical	nature	of	the	artifacts	involved,	reliably	give	
rise	to	those	sorts	of	experiences.25 
The	 existence	 of	 framed	 process	 art	 is	 crucial	 to	 allaying	 certain	
worries	about	the	status	of	the	process	arts	as	genuine	arts	—	or	at	least	
their	having	art-like	value.	The	frame	is	crucial	 to	how	art	 functions	
and	why	it	is	valuable.	The	fact	that	we	share	a	frame	helps	to	control	
and	stabilize	how	different	people	attend	to	the	material	substrate	of	
traditional	art	objects.	It	directs	our	various	attentions	along	a	similar	
course	and	towards	a	well-defined	range	of	aspects;	it	brings	the	ap-
pearance	of	a	painting	or	the	narrative	of	a	novel	to	the	fore.	In	process	
art,	the	frame	functions	in	the	same	way	—	but	in	this	case,	our	aesthet-
ic	attentions	are	directed	towards	particular	aspects	of	our	actions	and	
25.	 The	discussion	of	frames	and	framed	works	in	this	section	is	an	extension	of	
(and	improvement	on)	my	earlier	and	much	narrower	discussion	of	framing	
prescriptions	in	games	(Nguyen	2019d;	2020,	124–133).
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Lopes’	account	is	surely	right	about	certain	sorts	of	computer	art,	
especially	the	interactive	art	installations	in	museums,	which	are	his	
primary	 focus.	 In	 many	 cases,	 interacting	 with	 the	 artwork	 is	 effort-
less.	There	is	little	in	the	design	or	context	to	draw	the	user’s	attention	
to	their	own	activity.	Their	attention	is	directed,	 instead,	 to	a	virtual	
environment	or	a	space	of	choices.	Compare	these	sorts	of	object	to,	
say,	an	arcade	game	such	as	Super Mario Brothers,	where	the	center	of	
the	 experience	 is	 my	 skilled	 navigation	 of	 the	 challenges.	 The	 core	
elements	of	these	sorts	of	games	are	failure,	the	development	of	skill,	
and	 the	 deployment	 of	 skill	 during	 repeated	 attempts	 to	 overcome	
obstacles	 (Juul	 2013).	 When	 I	 play	 Super Mario Brothers,	 I	 encounter	
the	same	simple	environments	and	visual	and	musical	elements	over	
and	over	again;	what	changes	are	my	skill	and	my	choices.	In	fact,	the	
simplicity	and	the	repetitiousness	of	the	visual	elements	are	useful	for	
drawing	attention	towards	player	activity;	the	visual	content	of	these	
elements	recedes	from	attention,	thus	focusing	the	player’s	attention	
on	 their	 environment’s	 practical	 aspects	—	its	 existence	 as	 challenge	
and	obstacle.28	This,	in	turn,	foregrounds	the	enactor’s	active	presence.	
It	foregrounds	their	skill	—	and	lets	them,	over	time,	aesthetically	ap-
preciate	their	journey	through	skill	development.	That	journey	begins	
in	their	 lack	of	skill,	moves	through	stages	of	delightful	skill	acquisi-
tion,	and	climaxes	in	a	highly	skilled	achievement.	In	fact,	the	appre-
ciative	heart	of	much	gaming	practice	is	in	the	experience	of	bringing	
yourself,	over	time	and	through	much	effort,	into	greater	and	greater	
practical	harmony	with	a	set	of	challenges,	peaking	with	that	perfectly	
executed	victory.
Some	interactive	art,	then,	is	object	art.	There,	our	focus	is	on	the	
stable	 object	 which	 our	 activities	 reveal	—	on	 the	 algorithm,	 the	 vir-
tual	 environment,	 the	 possibility	 space.	 Other	 interactive	 art	 is	 pro-
cess	art.	There,	our	attention	is	on	our	activity	itself,	which	may	vary	
would	be	to	treat	architecture	as	a	process	art	—	where	we	take	the	movement	
itself	as	the	primary	focus	of	our	aesthetic	attention.
28.	Simon	Dor	provides	a	useful	discussion	of	how	repetitive	visual	elements	in	
StarCraft II	focus	the	attention	on	non-visual	strategic	elements	(Dor	2014).
6. Aren’t we really just looking at the artifact, in the end?
Finally,	 one	 might	 insist	 that	 the	 process	 arts	 are	 not	 really	 distinct	
from	the	object	arts.	Perhaps	what	we	are	doing,	with	all	of	our	activ-
ity	with	games	and	food,	is	simply	a	way	for	us	to	come	to	terms	with	
the	 object	 itself.	 Lopes	 explores	 such	 a	 possibility	 in	 his	 account	 of	
interactive	computer	art.	Suppose	I	am	using	a	 joystick	 to	explore	a	
virtual	 space	on	a	 computer	 installation.	My	 interaction	generates	a	
sequence	of	displays.	Crucially,	says	Lopes,	the	artwork	isn’t	the	par-
ticular	sequence	of	displays	that	I	generated.	I	am	not	the	artist,	and	
my	particular	voyage	through	virtual	space	is	not	an	artwork.	The	real	
artwork	consists	of	stable	features	that	are	shared	between	all	users	of	
the	work:	 the	algorithm,	the	program,	and	the	possibility	space	that	
these	other	features	create.	In	this	case,	says	Lopes,	I	am	not	prescribed	
to	aesthetically	attend	to	my	own	activity.	Rather,	my	activity	is	simply	
the	means	through	which	I	appreciate	the	stable	artwork.	Maneuver-
ing	through	a	virtual	space	and	participating	in	virtual	events	is,	then,	
something	like	a	very	complex	version	of	walking	around	a	sculpture.	
My	movements	and	choices	are	simply	my	method	for	bringing	the	
whole	of	the	work	into	view.	This	account	permits	Lopes	to	assimilate	
computer	art	to	the	traditional	object	art	paradigm.26	Similar	sugges-
tions	have	been	made	about	architecture,	as	we	might	move	through	
and	around	a	piece	of	architecture	for	the	sake	of	studying	its	move-
ment-independent	shape	and	structure.	Such	an	instrumental	view,	as	
Jenefer	 Robinson	 says,	 treats	 movement	 as	 merely	 a	 means	 for	 con-
structing	“a	mental	representation	of	the	form	of	a	building	considered	
as	a	static	structure”	(Robinson	2012,	343).27 
26.	This	 discussion	 of	 Lopes	 is	 drawn	 from	 my	 discussion	 in	 (Nguyen	 2020,	
145–146).
27.	 Consider,	on	the	other	hand,	Robinson’s	own	account	of	the	place	of	move-
ment	 in	 architecture.	 She	 insists	 that	 we	 must	 not	 only	 look	 or	 imagine	 a	
piece	of	architecture,	but	move	through	it.	But,	 in	Robinson’s	account,	 it	 is	
still	the	architecture	that	is	the	primary	focus	of	aesthetic	appreciation.	She	
wishes	us	to	use	our	proprioceptive	senses	to	appreciate	the	architecture,	but	
movement,	here,	is	part	of	the	process	through	which	we	discover	and	appre-
ciate	aesthetic	qualities	in	the	architecture	itself.	This	is	different	from	what	it	
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object-revealing.	Under	the	transparency	thesis,	that	move	would	thus	
be	highly	favored.	On	the	other	hand,	under	the	transparency	thesis,	
those	actions	that	are	more	distant	from	stable	features	of	the	object	
would	 be	 less	 important.	 The	 transparency	 thesis	 renders	 aestheti-
cally	unimportant	those	actions	primarily	attributable	to	the	enactor’s	
own	 special	 creativity	 or	 ability,	 since	 they	 would	 be	 not	 be	 object-
revealing.	 But	 this	 runs	 against	 core	 features	 of	 the	 actual	 practices	
we’ve	been	looking	at.	In	many	of	these	practices,	participants	praise	
particular	artifacts	because	 they	serve	as	environments	 for	 fostering	
creativity.	Go	is	cherished,	as	a	game,	because	it	serves	as	such	an	intri-
cate	background	for	the	wonderful	experience	of	profound	intellectual	
creativity.	Portal	creates	the	conditions	for	a	very	particular	type	of	so-
lution,	but	leaves	much	room	for	the	player	to	fill	in	the	details	of	their	
own	 solution.	 Turkish	 breakfast	 is	 wonderful	 because	 the	 eater	 has	
a	luxurious	sense	of	freedom,	as	they	can	tweak	every	bite	to	match	
exactly	their	heart’s	desire	in	the	moment.	The	social	tango	is	beloved	
for	 giving	 rise	 to	 particular	 intimacies	 that	 are	 unique	 to	 each	 pair	
of	 dancers,	 and	 to	 their	 creative	 coordinated	 response	 to	 the	 music,	
the	moment,	and	the	mood.	Of	course,	the	existence	of	those	distant	
process-aesthetic	qualities	do	reveal	the	object’s	capacity	to	encourage	
such	qualities	—	but	that	simply	drives	us	back	to	the	sorts	of	evalua-
tions	of	the	object	which	are	secondary	to	aesthetic	evaluations	of	the	
inspired	actions.
The	 process	 arts	 are	 distinct	 from	 the	 object	 arts	 because	 they	
aesthetically	center	on	the	activity	of	the	enactor.	In	the	process	acts,	
these	activities	aren’t	used	as	a	means	to	attend	to	the	object.	Nor	do	
we	self-attend	preferentially	to	those	activities	which	are	more	likely	
to	reveal	the	true	features	of	the	object.	We	simply	self-attend	to	the	
aesthetic	qualities	of	our	activity,	and	then	we	secondarily	evaluate	the	
object	in	terms	of	its	capacities	to	encourage	and	foster	those	aestheti-
cally	rich	activities.	
from	encounter	to	encounter	and	from	enactor	to	enactor.	And	many	
interactive	artworks	are	hybrids,	such	as	most	first-person	computer	
role-playing	 games,	 which	 provide	 both	 beautiful	 environments	 for	
the	 player	 to	 freely	 explore,	 and	 frequent	 challenges	 that	 focus	 the	
player’s	attention	on	their	own	activity.	
Suppose,	 then,	 that	 we	 accept	 that	 in	 the	 practices	 I’ve	 de-
scribed	—	games,	 social	 tango,	 cooking	—	I	 am,	 in	 fact,	 orienting	 my	
aesthetic	 attention	 towards	 myself,	 and	 to	 the	 world	 as	 it	 relates	 to	
my	activity.	Still,	an	opponent	might	resist	my	claims	that	 there	 is	a	
distinctive	category	of	process	art.	They	might	insist	that	this	self-ori-
ented	aesthetic	attention	is	only	an	intermediary	—	a	means	which	we	
use	to	come	to	grips	with	the	aesthetic	properties	and	aesthetic	value	
of	 the	underlying	static	object.	That	 is,	we	might	 think	 that,	 in	play-
ing	Super Mario Brothers,	I	attend	to	my	own	experience	of	agency	as	a	
way	to	attend	to	the	aesthetic	qualities	of	the	game	itself.	Let’s	call	this	
the	transparency	thesis	about	process	aesthetics,	since	we	are	looking	
through	 our	 processes	 just	 in	 order	 to	 get	 a	 better	 aesthetic	 handle	
on	 the	 object	 beyond	 them.	 The	 transparency	 thesis,	 if	 true,	 would	
reveal	that	all	this	so-called	process	aesthetics	was	but	a	peculiar	sub-
category	of	object	aesthetics.	
But	the	transparency	thesis	seems	to	get	the	order	of	explanation	
the	 wrong	 way	 around.	 Attributions	 of	 process-type	 aesthetic	 quali-
ties	to	games	are	grounded	in	attributions	of	aesthetic	qualities	to	the	
emergent	activity.	We	praise	games	as	aesthetically	good	precisely	be-
cause	they	bring	about	aesthetically	good	play.	Furthermore,	the	trans-
parency	thesis	would	confine	our	aesthetic	attention	to	those	aspects	
of	our	actions	which	reveal	features	in	the	object.	That	is,	under	the	
transparency	 thesis,	 reflective	attention	 to	our	own	action	 is	part	of	
aesthetic	appreciation	only	insofar	is	it	reveals	aesthetic	properties	of	
the	 object.	 Thus,	 in	 appreciating	 an	 object	 through	 our	 activity,	 we	
should	 look	 primarily	 to	 the	 object-revealing	 features	 in	 our	 action.	
Take,	for	example,	a	rock	climb	in	which	a	particular	movement	was	
forced	 by	 the	 climb	 as	 the	 only	 movement	 that	 would	 allow	 prog-
ress.	 That	 forced	 move	 is	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	 object	 and	 thus	 highly	
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will	be	experiencing	exactly	the	same	aesthetic	property	as	it	arises	in	
exactly	the	same	activity.29 
There	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	 sliding	 scale.	 The	 more	 rigidly	 delineated	
the	space	of	actions,	 the	closer	 those	experiences	will	be.	Some	vid-
eogames,	 such	 as	 Dragon’s Lair, offer	 simple	 reflex	 challenges	 in	 a	
fixed	sequence.	Similarly,	some	rock	climbing	problems	require	such	
specific	and	precise	movements	 to	succeed	 that	 rock	climbers	often	
find	 themselves	 performing	 nearly	 identical	 sequences.30	 But	 this	 is	
certainly	not	the	case	across	all	the	process	arts.	Many	of	the	process	
arts	offer	the	enactor	significant	freedom	of	choice,	where	various	en-
actors’	differing	decisions	will	help	shape	very	different	engagements	
for	each	of	them.	This	is	crucial,	since	many	of	the	process	arts	seem	
designed	to	support	those	aesthetic	qualities	which	arise	from	giving	
the	enactor	genuine	choices.	Perhaps	 the	deepest	pleasures	of	Turk-
ish	breakfast	are	in	constructing	for	myself,	at	each	moment,	what	my	
next	most	pleasurable	bite	will	be.	 (One	might	note	a	 certain	 trend	
in	high-end	restaurants,	which	offer	carefully	constructed	single	bites.	
This	strategy	trades	away	diner	autonomy	in	favor	of	the	chef’s	control	
of	the	experience,	presumably	in	the	name	of	bringing	the	dining	ex-
perience	towards	the	stability	of	object	art.)	Many	games	are	praised	
precisely	because	they	afford	their	players	genuine	freedom	—	because	
a	player’s	choices	will	help	form	the	narrative	or	shape	the	simulated	
world.	In	fact,	some	games	seem	to	offer	us	an	aesthetic	experience	of	
our	own	freedom	(Gingerich	2018)	—	which	would	be	inaccessible	if	
the	designers	eliminated	choice	in	the	favor	of	a	controlled,	repeatable	
experience.	
29.	Alternately,	 one	 might	 reject	 the	 claim	 that	 we	 can	 ever	 be	 in	 touch	 with	
the	same	aesthetic	properties,	even	in	the	object	arts.	One	might	think	that	
aesthetic	properties	depend	substantially	on	an	application	of	the	skills	and	
abilities	of	the	observer.	(Mary	Mothersill’s	account	might	be	read	to	support	
such	a	view	[Mothersill	1984]).	That	may	be	true,	but	such	a	view	would	only	
further	erode	 the	reasons	one	might	have	 thought	elevated	 the	object	arts	
over	the	process	arts.
30.	Montero	discusses	how	dancers	may	approximate	a	shared	experience	of	mo-
tion	through	careful	talk	(Montero	2006).
7. The status of process art: On sharing experiences
Why	 have	 we	 traditionally	 emphasized	 the	 object	 arts	 over	 the	 pro-
cess	arts?	A	complete	diagnosis,	I	suspect,	will	draw	significantly	on	
the	resources	of	cultural	and	intellectual	history,	sociology,	economics,	
and	 more.	 Here,	 I	 will	 examine	 a	 few	 philosophical	 sources	 for	 the	
historical	preference	for	the	object	arts,	and	then	give	some	defenses	
of	 the	process	arts.	These	final	sections	of	 this	paper	should	be	con-
sidered	an	opening	salvo	on	 this	 topic;	 I	have	selected	a	handful	of	
skirmishes	to	help	illuminate	my	positive	account.	
One	philosophical	explanation	for	the	higher	status	of	the	object	
arts	is	that	they	make	available	a	relatively	stable	appreciative	focus.	
The	attentive	focus	is	on	a	shareable	object.	We	can	all	read	the	same	
work	and	talk	about	it.	We	lose	this,	to	some	degree,	with	process	art.	
There	is	an	artifact	we	can	share	—	the	game,	the	recipe,	the	city	—	but	
the	enactor’s	agency	intervenes	between	the	designer’s	work	and	the	
attentive	focus.	Obviously	this	 is	 true	with	enactor	process	arts,	 like	
tango,	but	it	is	also	true	for	artist	process	arts,	like	games.	Even	when	
the	 designers	 have	 tightly	 constrained	 the	 choice	 space	 to	 give	 the	
player’s	activity	very	specific	aesthetic	qualities	—	still,	different	game	
players	have	different	skills	and	make	different	choices.	The	precise	
content	 of	 the	 attentive	 focus,	 and	 the	 precise	 form	 of	 its	 attendant	
aesthetic	properties,	varies	from	one	enactor	to	the	next,	even	when	
they	are	engaging	with	the	very	same	process	artwork.	
Why	did	we	want	a	stable	attentive	focus	in	the	first	place?	There	
are	a	few	reasons.	First,	the	practice	of	the	object	arts	makes	it	possible	
to	have	shared	experiences,	or	something	that	approaches	them.	One	
might	 think,	of	a	graceful	drawing,	 that	 the	gracefulness	was	 in	 the	
drawing	 itself.	 Thus,	 we	 different	 appreciators	 can	 all	 be	 in	 contact	
with	the	very	same	gracefulness.	With	the	process	arts,	on	the	other	
hand,	we	cannot	have	such	mutually	shared	contact	with	one	and	the	
same	aesthetic	property.	Since,	in	the	process	arts,	the	focus	of	appre-
ciation	is	each	enactor’s	own	separately	generated	activity,	no	enactors	
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8. The status of process art: Cognitively, merit, and uniqueness
Finally,	 one	 might	 worry	 that	 something	 about	 the	 appreciation	 of	
processes	essentially	conflicts	with	the	nature	of	the	aesthetic	and	of	
art.	According	to	some	popular	accounts	of	artistic	and	aesthetic	value,	
aesthetic	experiences	must	have	a	special	relationship	to	some	inde-
pendent	states	of	affairs.31 
	 First,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 aesthetic	 experiences,	 by	 their	
nature,	 must	 involve	 some	 form	 of	 cognition of	 a	 distinct	 state	 of	 af-
fairs.	Loosely,	the	thought	is	that	aesthetic	experiences	aren’t	just	free-
floating	pleasures	or	some	other	mental	state	whose	value	is	derived	
wholly	from	its	internal	character.	Rather,	aesthetic	experiences	must	
involve	an	accurate	perception	or	appraisal	of	some	independent	state	
of	affairs.	I	intend	‘state	of	affairs’	here	to	include	anything	that	could	
be	 the	object	of	an	experience,	 including	physical	objects,	activities,	
internal	states,	and	events.32	There	are	at	least	two	versions	of	the	re-
quirement	for	cognitivity.	Depending	on	the	account,	either	aesthetic	
experience	must	involve	the	correct	cognition	of	particular	aesthetic	
features	in	the	independent	state	of	affairs,	or	it	must	involve	the	cor-
rect	cognition	of	that	state’s	aesthetic	merit.33	Such	theories	are	usually	
driven	by	the	need	to	explain	our	rational	discourse	about	aesthetic	
31.	 I	 am	 using	 ‘aesthetic	 experience’	 here	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 brevity;	 some	 of	 the	
theories	I	am	discussing	speak	in	terms	of	a	distinctive	character	to	“aesthetic	
appreciation”	or	“aesthetic	judgment”.	Nothing	I	say	here	turns	on	the	differ-
ences	 between	 thinking	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	 experiences,	
appreciations,	or	judgments.
32.	 Note	that	my	way	of	putting	things	here	departs	from	the	typical	language	in	
the	academic	literature,	which	is	usually	of	relationships	between	aesthetic	
experiences	 and	 their	 objects.	 ‘Objects’	 is	 meant	 in	 these	 cases	 to	 refer	 to	
‘objects	of	experience’,	and	is	so	identical	in	meaning	to	my	use	of	the	term	
‘states	of	affairs’.	I	use	the	term	‘state	of	affairs’	only	to	avoid	any	potential	con-
fusion	between	the	notion	of	an	object	of	experience	(which	could	include	
activities)	and	the	notion	of	a	physical	object	(which	excludes	activities).
33.	 For	example,	Monroe	Beardsley’s	account	of	aesthetic	value	makes	such	cog-
nition	 a	 key	 component	 of	 valuable	 aesthetic	 experience	 (Beardsley	 1979,	
728).	Malcolm	Budd	makes	a	similar	claim	(Budd	1996).	More	recently,	James	
Shelley	’s	account	and	Keren	Gorodeisky’s	and	Eric	Marcus’	account	involve	
crucial	reference	to	such	a	principle	(Shelley	2010;	Gorodeisky	and	Marcus	
2018).	For	a	further	discussion,	see	(Nguyen	2019b).
In	such	cases	I	think	we	must	give	up	on	the	hope	of	sharing	pre-
cisely	the	same	content	in	our	engagements	with	process	art.	Here	is	
where	the	process	arts	differ	essentially	from	the	object	arts.	The	value	
of	much	process	art	 is	 that	 it	makes	significant	room	for	 the	agency	
of	 the	enactor.	Having	genuine	agency	 in	generating	 the	content	of	
one’s	aesthetic	experience	is	at	odds	with	sharing	precisely	the	same	
content	with	others.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	process	arts	may	bring	to	different	people	
experiences	 of	 agency	 with	 very	 much	 the	 same	 character.	 Players	
typically	come	up	with	very	different	particular	solutions	to	particular	
puzzles,	 but	 the	 character	 of	 the	 experience	—	of	 coping	 with	 these	
puzzles	with	such	a	particular	and	peculiar	affordance,	of	having	 to	
learn	to	think	in	terms	of	manipulating	the	topology,	of	figuring	out	
particular	tricks	—	is	sharply	similar.	That	is	what	we	gain	by	putting	
attentional	frames	around	our	active	processes.	Different	enactors	are	
channeled	 into	a	similar	situation	when	 they	engage	with	 the	same	
process	artwork,	and	so	when	they	act,	the	qualities	of	their	actions	
can	be	quite	similar.	But	we	must	sacrifice	the	precise	shareability	of	
aesthetic	content	in	order	to	have	particularly	aesthetically	infused	ex-
periences	 of	 our	 own	 free	 choice.	 What	 having	 framed	 process	 arts	
gets	 us	 is	 not	 precise	 shareability,	 in	 these	 cases,	 but	 some	 near	 ap-
proximation	—	far	 nearer	 than	 we	 would	 get	 otherwise.	 There	 will	
likely	be	little	overlap	in	the	experiences	of	process	aesthetics	that	you	
and	I	might	have	as	we	go	about	our	 incredibly	different	days,	with	
our	widely	varying	practical	struggles.	But	in	a	game,	we	can	fix	the	
goals,	fix	the	abilities	we	have,	and	fix	the	environmental	challenges.	
Even	if	you	and	I	don’t	make	precisely	the	same	movement	to	get	over	
this	jumping	challenge	in	Super Mario Brothers,	we	are	using	the	exact	
same	fixed	abilities,	while	confronting	the	exact	same	challenges,	and	
pursuing	exactly	the	same	goal.	And	this	will	put	our	aesthetic	experi-
ences	in	close	proximity	and	give	them	a	markedly	shared	character,	
even	if	we	aren’t	fixed	on	exactly	the	same	aesthetic	object.
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value	 by	 eating,	 say,	 sautéed	 liver	 instead	—	and	 the	 liver	 would	 be	
just	as	valuable	to	me,	and	valuable	in	exactly	the	same	way.	As	James	
Shelley	puts	it,	the	particular	value	of	an	artwork	is	inseparable	from	
the	artwork	itself.35 
Let’s	grant,	for	the	moment,	that	artworks	must	be	unique	in	this	
way.	 Perhaps	 the	 problem	 with	 process	 art	 is	 that	 its	 artworks	 lack	
uniqueness.	If	the	value	of	a	process	artwork	is	not	in	the	artwork	it-
self,	but	 in	the	activity	 that	 it	 inspires,	 then	we	might	think	that	 the	
value	is	detachable	from	the	specific	artwork.	Perhaps	a	particular	oc-
currence	of	an	activity	—	like	one	particular	session	of	chess	—	might	
have	a	unique	value,	inseparable	from	that	particular	activity.	But	the	
artifacts	—	the	games,	the	recipes,	the	cities	—	are	too	distant	from	that	
unique	value,	 their	 features	 too	separable	 from	the	aesthetic	proper-
ties,	which	occur	far	downstream	of	the	artifact.	Thus,	we	might	con-
clude,	there	can	be	no	such	thing	as	process	artworks.
But	 I	 do	 think	 process	 artworks	 can	 often	 have	 a	 sort	 of	 unique-
ness,	though	one	that	comes	via	a	more	complex	series	of	stages	than	
with	object	artworks.	The	particular	qualities	of	a	process	artwork	can	
uniquely	 inform	 the	 aesthetic	 activities	 they	 inspire.	 The	 activity	 of	
solving	a	chess	puzzle	cannot	be	had	outside	of	chess.	Any	aesthet-
ic	 value	 that	 we	 find	 in	 the	 player’s	 chess	 activities,	 insofar	 as	 they	
are	unique	to	that	enactor’s	engagement	with	chess,	is	also	unique	to	
chess.	And	the	exact	nature	of	that	aesthetic	value	is	informed	by	the	
particularities	 of	 chess’	 design.	 Let’s	 call	 this	 feature	 aesthetic depen-
dence.	An	activity	 is	aesthetically	dependent	on	an	artifact	when	the	
precise	aesthetic	character	of	 that	activity	 is	dependent	on	 its	being	
evoked	 by	 that	 particular	 artifact.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 process	 arts	 have	
their	 own	 distinctive	 form	 of	 uniqueness.	 An	 enactor’s	 activity	 can	
be	uniquely	valuable	 in	 the	same	way	a	piece	of	object	art	can.	But	
also,	in	many	cases,	that	activity	also	aesthetically	depends	upon	the	
35.	 (Shelley	2010)	also	offers	an	excellent	overview	of	discussions	of	the	unique-
ness	requirement,	including	versions	by	Malcolm	Budd,	Stephen	Davies,	and	
Jerrold	 Levinson.	 Budd	 offers	 a	 particularly	 clear	 statement	 of	 the	 view	 in	
(Budd	1996,	4–11).
experiences	—	how	we	seem	 to	correct	each	other’s	 aesthetic	experi-
ences	by	pointing	out	features	we’ve	missed,	or	give	reasons	in	support	
of	a	given	evaluation	of	aesthetic	merit.	Aesthetic	life	often	involves	
getting	things	wrong	and	then	coming	to	see	things	rightly.	Features	of	
our	aesthetic	practice	seem	to	indicate	that	aesthetic	experiences	are	
not	free-floating;	rather,	they	must	arise	from	accurate	comprehension	
of	some	independent	state.	That	requires	a	separation	between	the	ex-
perience	itself	and	what	it	is	of.34	Perhaps	there	can	be	no	such	a	sepa-
ration	with	process	artworks,	since	the	aesthetic	experiences	aren’t	of	
the	artist’s	work,	but	of	the	enactor’s	own	activity.
Suppose	we	grant	such	a	demand	for	a	separation	between	experi-
ence	and	the	independent	state	that	experience	is	of.	Even	then,	this	
presents	no	particular	problem	for	the	process	arts.	Such	independent	
states	need	not	be	external,	physical	artifacts.	That	is,	we	need	not	be	
limited	in	our	aesthetic	experiences	to	experiences	of	physical	objects.	
To	satisfy	the	cognitivity	requirement,	we	simply	need	our	experiences	
to	be	of	states	of	affairs	distinct	from	those	experiences.	In	the	process	
arts,	 that	 independent	 state	of	affairs	 is	 the	enactor’s	activity,	which	
is	distinct	from	the	enactor’s	experience	of	that	activity.	Doing	some-
thing	is	distinct	from	one’s	experience	of	doing	it.	
Next,	 let’s	 turn	 to	 the	 requirement	 for	 the	uniqueness	of	aesthetic	
value.	According	to	some,	the	value	of	an	artwork	must	be	unique	to	
that	artwork	—	unlike,	say,	the	value	of	money	or	nutrition.	According	
to	this	view,	the	value	of	a	particular	artwork	cannot	be	achieved	via	
a	different	artwork.	There	 is	no	 substitute	 for	 the	experience	of	 the	
Wu-Tang	 Clan’s	 rap	 masterpiece	 Enter the Wu Tang (36 Chambers); its	
value	is	inextricably	specific	to	its	exact	content	and	aesthetic	proper-
ties.	Another	work,	like	Bill	Evans’	Sunday at the Village Vanguard,	might	
also	be	a	masterpiece,	but	it	does	not	offer	an	alternate	route	to	the	
very	same	value	offered	by	Enter the Wu Tang (36 Chambers).	Artwork	
values	aren’t	fungible.	On	the	other	hand,	if	I	am	eating	this	spinach	
salad	strictly	for	its	Vitamin	K	content,	I	could	also	achieve	exactly	that	
34.	 I	take	such	object/experience	views	to	be	expressed	by	(Shelley	2010)	and	
(Zangwill	2007,	127–159).
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without	 reference	 to	 the	 particular	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 in	 which	 they	
occurred.	A	leap	is	not	necessarily	a	game	action,	and	the	beauty	of	
a	 leap	not	necessarily	dependent	 for	 its	existence	on	being	situated	
within	a	particular	game.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	actions	of	making	
a	basket	or	performing	an	assist	are,	by	 their	nature,	actions	within	
the	game	of	basketball.	The	actions	themselves	are	constituted,	in	part,	
by	 the	 game	 rules.	 If	 a	 particular	 game-action	 is	 beautiful	 as a game 
action,	 then	 that	 aesthetic	 activity	 is	 aesthetically	 dependent	 on	 the	
game.	If	the	loveliness	of	my	dunk	shot	arises	not	from	the	movements	
themselves,	but	from	the	movements	understood	as	moves	within	the	
game	—	from	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 are	 elegant	 solutions	 to	 challenges	
brought	into	being	by	the	rules	of	the	game	—	then	that	beautiful	dunk	
shot	is	aesthetically	dependent	on	the	game	of	basketball.	Which	is	not	
to	say	that	the	rules	of	basketball	entirely	fix	the	aesthetic	properties	of	
each	particular	dunk	shot.	This	is	the	essential	difference	between	the	
object	arts	and	the	process	arts.	My	dunk,	in	basketball,	is	mine.	But	
basketball	creates	the	conditions	for	that	dunk	and	its	beauty,	and	the	
rules	of	basketball	play	a	significant	and	inextricable	role	in	the	forma-
tion	of	that	particular	occurrence	of	beauty.
The	process	arts,	then,	offer	their	own	peculiar	version	of	unique-
ness.	In	many	cases	—	but	certainly	not	all	—	the	aesthetic	qualities	of	
the	enactor’s	activity	are	inseparable	from	a	particular	work	of	process	
art.	This	does	not	mean	that	particular,	finalized	aesthetic	qualities	are	
to	be	found	in	the	process	artwork	itself.	But	the	process	artwork	cre-
ates	 the	special	background	conditions	under	which	those	aesthetic	
qualities	can	arise.	A	process	artwork	does	not	entirely	determine	the	
aesthetic	qualities	 that	arise	 from	 it,	but	many	of	 those	qualities	de-
pend,	for	their	exact	nature,	on	the	particular	process	artwork	which	
enables	their	existence.
9. Conclusions
I	have	offered	the	beginnings	of	a	diagnosis	of	the	traditional	prefer-
ence	for	the	object	arts.	In	the	object	arts,	we	can	have	a	shared	object	
of	attention.	Furthermore,	in	the	object	arts,	it	is	fairly	straightforward	
particular	 process	 artwork	 that	 inspired	 it.	 In	 those	 cases,	 the	 value	
of	 the	 activity	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 process	 artwork	 which	 provides	
the	 unique	 condition	 for	 its	 existence.	 Notice	 that	 the	 structures	 of	
the	uniqueness	relationships	are	different	between	the	object	and	pro-
cess	arts.	The	uniqueness	relationship	in	object	arts	is,	conceivably,	a	
one-to-one	relationship.	Here	is	one	pair:	the	work	Enter the Wu Tang 
(36 Chambers) and	 its	value.	Each	uniquely	belongs	 to	 the	other.	But	
uniqueness	relationships	in	the	process	arts	have	a	tree-like	structure.	
The	game	Portal	can	give	rise	to	many	different	aesthetically	valuable	
activities,	but	each	of	 those	aesthetically	valuable	activities	depends	
on	Portal	as	the	unique	condition	of	its	existence.	
Not	 all	 process	 arts	 will	 give	 rise	 to	 aesthetic	 dependence,	 but	
many	do.	The	most	obvious	cases	of	aesthetic	dependence	are	games.	
In	Bernard	Suits’	 influential	analysis,	games	turn	out	 to	be	activities	
constituted	 by	 the	 specified	 constraints	 and	 goals	—	the	 rules	 of	 the	
game.	In	other	words,	a	set	of	game	rules	brings	into	being	new	sorts	
of	actions	and	activities.	What	 it	 is	 to	“make	a	basket”,	 in	a	game	of	
basketball,	isn’t	merely	to	pass	a	ball	through	a	metal	hoop.	To	make	a	
basket	is	to	pass	the	ball	through	the	hoop	while	obeying	the	dribbling	
rule	and	all	the	other	constraints,	and	while	facing	opponents.	There	is	
no	such	thing	as	“making	a	basket”	separate	from	those	various	rules.36 
When	 the	 game	 uniquely	 constitutes	 the	 activity,	 and	 the	 aesthetic	
qualities	of	the	activity	depend	on	unique	features	of	the	activity,	then	
we	have	aesthetic	dependence.	
Suppose	I	am	playing	basketball	and	perform	an	absolutely	beauti-
ful	fake-out,	 followed	by	a	perfect	behind-the-back	pass	to	my	team-
mate,	just	as	they	are	jumping	into	place	for	a	dunk.	The	various	aes-
thetic	properties	of	 those	actions	cannot	be	described	without	 refer-
ences	 to	 the	 specific	 rules	 and	 constraints	 of	 basketball.	 This	 is	 not	
true	for	all	action	and	movement.	I	could	leap	with	elegance	and	flair,	
and,	 in	 some	cases,	 that	elegance	and	flair	 could	be	comprehended	
36.	 (Suits	2005).	I’ve	given	a	slightly	simplified	summary	for	the	purposes	of	this	
argument.	I’ve	offered	a	detailed	analysis	of	Suits’	view	and	its	implications	in	
(Nguyen	2020,	5–11,	52–73).
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to	locate	the	aesthetic	value.	If	the	value	of	an	artwork	lies	in	its	aes-
thetic	 properties,	 then	 the	 value	 of	 the	 object	 arts	 is	 fairly	 self-con-
tained.	We	could,	at	least,	act	as	if	we	could	arrive	at	a	collective	shared	
judgment	of	an	object	artwork’s	properties	and	value.	
It	 is	not	so	with	the	process	arts.	There,	the	value	is	far	more	dis-
tributed.	The	aesthetic	value	of	a	work	lies	in	its	capacity	to	instigate	
aesthetically	valuable	activity.	This	is	diametrically	opposed	to	many	
traditional	accounts	of	aesthetic	and	artistic	value.	Malcolm	Budd,	for	
example,	has	demanded	that	we	find	an	account	in	which	an	artwork	
is	valuable	in	itself,	and	not	merely	as	a	tool	for	some	further	experi-
ence	(Budd	1996).	With	the	process	arts,	we	must	admit	that	the	art-
work	is,	in	fact,	often	merely	an	instrument.	In	many	cases,	the	primary	
aesthetic	value	attaches	to	the	instigated	activity	and	not	to	the	work	
itself.	The	work	can	play	an	indispensable	role	in	bringing	about	the	
particular	aesthetic	qualities	of	the	activity,	but	the	aesthetic	qualities	
are	 not	 finalized	 until	 the	 enactor	 has	 played	 their	 own	 active	 role.	
That	 is	 not	 something	 I	 think	 we	 can	 get	 past.	 It	 is	 essential	 to	 the	
very	nature	of	the	process	arts.	Of	course,	this	doesn’t	tell	us	that	the	
practice	of	engaging	with	process	arts	has	less	aesthetic	value.	It	only	
shows	us	that	in	order	to	cope	with	it,	we	will	have	to	distribute	the	
locus	of	aesthetic	value	between	artwork	and	enactor’s	activity.	This	
is,	in	fact,	exactly	what	makes	the	process	arts	special.	The	artifacts	of	
process	art	can	participate	substantially	in	the	aesthetic	end	product	
and	its	particular	value	—	without	finalizing	that	value.37 
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